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ABSTRACT
The United States needs to do considerably more to counteract Russia and China’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean
and South and East China Sea with sophisticated, multidimensional,
multilateral, and ambitious efforts of its own. By adopting a much
more pro-active, comprehensive, and well-coordinated global energy
security strategy embedded in a broad approach to human security1
1 See generally BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR: THE NATIONAL SECURITY
PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1983) [hereinafter PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR];
BARRY BUZAN, OLE WAEVER & JAAP DE WILDE, SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS (1998); KEITH KRAUSE & MICHAEL C. WILLIAMS, CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES:
CONCEPTS AND CASES (1997) [CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES]; Ken Booth, Beyond Critical
Security Studies, in CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND WORLD POLITICS 268 (Ken Booth ed.,
2005); Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams, Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies:
Politics and Methods, 40 MERSHON INT’L STUD. REV. 229 (1996). Traditional security approaches towards threat are confined to centrally government controlled military threats.
These methodologies have expanded to include threats that challenge economic and environmental security and questions. In depth security studies have pursued greater understanding of the values within which security is embedded. Some critical approaches – such as the
collection produced by Krause and Williams, Critical Security Studies – are deconstructionist, in a tentative sense of unpacking and problematizing prevailing understandings of security. See generally KRAUSE & WILLIAMS, CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES, supra. They identify
the limitations and contradictions of orthodox security studies and international relations
theory and point the way to a better understanding of what security means. KRAUSE &
WILLIAMS, CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES, supra. Others propose a more coherent – and consciously alternative – agenda. However, beyond a common opposition to neorealism, the
non-traditional and critical approaches to security often fundamentally diverge. In particular, they differ on what the referent object of security should be, whether the objective
should be to securitize or de-securitize (and the implications of this), and whether the emphasis should be on normative or explanatory theory. Some non-traditional approaches retain the state as the referent object of study, and broaden their analysis of the threats to the
state, to include – for example – economic, societal, environmental, and political security
challenges. Barry Buzan’s landmark book, People, States and Fear, suggested that the individual is the ‘irreducible base unit’ for explorations of security, but the referent of security
must remain the state as it is the central actor in international politics and the principal agent
for addressing insecurity. BARRY BUZAN, PEOPLE, STATES AND FEAR, supra. Other critical
approaches challenge the state-centricity of security analysis fundamentally and argue that
individuals or humans collectively should be the referent object of security. For Booth: “A
critical theory of security seeks to denaturalize and historicize all human-made political referents, recognizing only the primordial entity of the socially embedded individual.” Booth,
Beyond Critical Security Studies, in CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra, at 268. He continues: “The only transhistorical and permanent fixture in human society
is the individual physical being, and so this must naturally be the ultimate referent in the security problematique.” Booth, Beyond Critical Security Studies, in CRITICAL SECURITY
STUDIES AND WORLD POLITICS, supra, at 264.
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and international law of the sea, 2 allies together with other powers
could achieve peace, stability, and prosperity in the regions.
America could complement the ambitions of regional pivotal
or major powers by supporting international maritime law arbitration
by becoming a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea [‘UNCLOS’]. 3 Such a move would give the United
States greater credibility on the world stage 4 providing more
2 See D.C. KAPOOR & ADAM J. KERR, A GUIDE TO MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION 110 (1986); TED L. MCDORMAN, ALEXANDER J. BOLLA, DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON & JOHN DUFF,
INTERNATIONAL OCEAN LAW, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARIES 16-20 (2005); LOUS B. SOHN
& KRISTEN GUSTAFSON, THE LAW OF THE SEA, at xvii (1984). “The law of the sea is an integral part of international law which has evolved over a period of five hundred years or more
through customary and treaty law and the practice of States.” KAPOOR & KERR, supra, at 1.
The history of the law of the sea has been one of balancing the conflicting interests of nations with a primary interest in shipping (maritime states) and nations with interests based on
security or resource uses of their adjacent waters (coastal states). “There have been constant
battles between the concepts of mare liberum and mare clausum through the history of the
law of the sea.” SUN PYO KIM, MARITIME DELIMITATION AND INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS IN
NORTH EAST ASIA 17 (2004). At the beginning mare liberum seemed to have won the battle
against mare clausum and the principle of freedom of seas applied virtually to all of the sea,
namely the high sea beyond a narrow belt of water along the coastlines, called the territorial
sea, which was under the sovereignty of a coastal State. Freedom of navigation was the
dominant custom in international sea law, subject to limited coastal state jurisdiction over
waters adjacent to their shoreline. However, since 1945, a movement to extend jurisdiction
over the sea emerged, then mare clausum has been dominant, and “the trend clearly has been
toward enclosing the ocean with ever broader coastal state claims of sovereignty or other
competence to exclude other users of the oceans. J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH,
EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 3 (3d ed. 2012). “Over the last 60 years or so, many controversies relating to the law of the sea have involved the right to control and exploit resources,
whether in the form of oil, fish, or other potentially valuable commodities.” Gerhard von
Glahn & James Larry Taulbee, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International
Law 296 (9th ed. 2010). Claims to control and have access to the resources of the sea resulted in unilateral claims to extensive territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and the
continental shelf. In response, states made an effort to codify the existing customary law and
created many new treaty rules and several institutions that fundamentally restructured the
traditional law of the sea.
3 See Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter
UNCLOS]; Oceans and Law of the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea,
UN, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC.htm
(last visited Mar. 26, 2017).
4 The National Security Council, under George W. Bush’s administration, concluded after
a careful interagency review that UNCLOS clearly serves U.S. national security, economic,
and environmental interests. John B. Bellinger III, Should the United States Ratify the UN
Law of the Sea?, COUNCIL OF FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/treaties-andagreements/should-united-states-ratify-un-law-sea/p31828 (last visited October 31, 2016).
As a result, the Bush Administration strongly supported Senate approval of the Convention,
as did the Obama administration. Id. “The Convention provides clear, treaty-based rights for
U.S. ships and aircraft to travel through and over the territorial seas of other coastal states.”
Id. The United States Navy strongly endorses that the United States become party to
UNCLOS. Id. The flaws President Reagan identified and opposed in the treaty “were fixed

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

3

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 [2017], Art. 10

830

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

trustworthiness to address broader human security issues like the
economy, environmental degradation, climate change, disease,
poverty, democracy and terrorism. The U.S. could advocate a ‘Joint
Maritime Development Regime,’ modeled after the Arctic Council. 5
Eastern Mediterranean maritime disputes, as well as tensions
in the South and East China Seas, encompass the challenges and issues that the Arctic Council is currently handling. The Council takes
into account the welfare of indigenous people making it into a model
for a ‘Joint Maritime Development Regime’ based on the security of
the individual or humans collectively as the referent object while the
states remain the central actors in international relations and the principal agent to address issues dealing with threats of security.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Increased exploration for oil and hydrocarbons in the East
Mediterranean Basin on the periphery of countries such as Cyprus,
Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt has led to the discovery of enormously significant gas and oil fields while mounting military tensions
rise in Syria with millions fleeing to neighboring countries and the
European Union (EU). 6 Entrenched in an international crisis, the
East Mediterranean is experiencing a ‘Renaissance’ in security terms
by estimating the impact these developments will have on the
strategic calculus of Europe, the U.S., and the Middle East. The
prosperity and security of key Eastern Mediterranean states are
increasingly affected by events in the Levant Basin and surroundings
by amendments to the treaty in 1994 (which led all other major industrial countries to join
the treaty”). Id.; see also Robert C. “Rock” De Tolve, At What Cost? America’s UNCLOS
Allergy in the Time of “Lawfare,” 61 NAVAL L. REV. 1 (2012).
http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/navylawreview/NLRVolume61.pdf (last visited Oct. 31,
2016).
5 SELECT COMMITTEE ON RESPONDING TO A CHANGING ARCTIC, Session 2014-15, HL 118
(UK); 20 Years of the Arctic Council: Making a Positive Future Impact, ARCTIC COUNCIL
(Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/20year-anniversary (last visited May 12, 2017).
6 See Tamsin Carlisle, The Eastern Mediterranean Basin Showing Promise for Oil, Gas:
BARREL
(Nov.
16,
2015,
00:01
UTC),
Fuel
for
Thought,
THE
http://blogs.platts.com/2015/11/16/eastern-mediterranean-basin-oil-gas/; Najima El Moussaoui, Wave of Syrian Refugees Comes at a High Cost, DW (Apr. 9, 2013),
http://www.dw.com/en/wave-of-syrian-refugees-comes-at-a-high-cost/a-17067169.
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in comparison to the two regions, the East and South China Seas,
discussed in greater detail later.
The volatile geopolitical region’s capacity in the Eastern
Mediterranean for producing crises as well as slow-moving
challenges—with potentially far-reaching consequences—has begun
to compel the attention of analysts and policymakers. The drivers for
Eastern Mediterranean Security issues have started to occupy a more
prominent place in security debates about Israel-Turkey-Iran-IraqPalestine-Cyprus-Lebanon-Egypt-Jordan-Saudi Arabia relations embedded in U.S., EU, and Russian national interests by imposing new
intellectual and policy challenges on both sides of the Atlantic. This
contrasts with the U.S. pivot to Asia and strong presence in dealing
with regional conflicts including the territorial issues in the East and
the South China Sea. 7
Hence, fresh new approaches to security and cooperation in
the East Mediterranean and China Seas is needed. Rethinking U.S.
foreign policy and geopolitical alliances requires a major overhaul to
deter Chinese expansionism and Russian policies aligned to a
doctrine where neighboring countries are part of their ‘sphere of
influence.’ As compared to China and the U.S. in Southeast Asia,
Israel, Turkey, and Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean are all
prepared to demonstrate military and naval force to protect their own
and other countries’ fundamental rights and interests (such as
Northern Cyprus 8 in the case of Turkey and Syria in the case of
Russia). This is true not only in cases involving fishing and marine
life, but also mineral and hydrocarbon resources, navigation and
other uses of the seas by upholding the fundamental integrity of a
‘sovereign North Cypriot’ or Syrian state.

7

See Ian O. Lesser, The United States and the Future of Mediterranean Security: Reflections from GMF’s Mediterranean Strategy Group, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND (Apr. 2015),
www.gmfus.org/file/5291/download.
8 Northern Cyprus (Turkish: Kuzey Kibris), officially the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus (TRNC), as part of an attempt to annex the island to Greece, prompted Turkey to intervene in Cyprus. Recognized only by Turkey, Northern Cyprus is considered by the international community to be part of the Republic of Cyprus. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, GLOBAL SECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/cy-trnc.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2017). Due to its lack of recognition, TRNC is heavily dependent on
Turkey for economic, political, and military support for the northeastern portion of the island
of Cyprus. Id. Because the international committees considers TRNC to be part of the Republic of Cyprus and, as such, a member of the EU, the aquis communautaire has been suspended in the area administered by Turkish Cypriots until political conditions permit the reunification of the island. Id.
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Solutions are needed for the long term to resolve issues related to sustainable economic prosperity and political stability, not only
in Syria, but the adjacent regions as well through greater cooperation
instead of confrontation. The international maritime law can work in
resolving Eastern Mediterranean and China Seas’ disputes and contribute to preparing confidence building parameters for further discussions of relevant issues related to sovereignty, political stability,
and economic growth.
The disputes over the sovereignty zones of the jurisdiction of
islands are growing among regional players, most notably Turkey,
Cyprus, and Israel, signaling an apparent return of power politics in
regional relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, until recent events
unfolded. In the past year presidential elections have been held on
both sides of the Cypriot Island which led to successful negotiations
indicating that a ‘Cyprus Settlement’ may be achievable very soon. 9
Also, a rapprochement between Turkey and Israel was achieved on
June 28, 2016, in which Israel agreed to a $20 million compensation
for the victims’ families following the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident
in which nine Turkish participants died. Here, it seems as if
diplomatic channels are playing a more significant role. 10 However,
there are still major regional issues to be resolved requiring the states
in the region to find an intergovernmental organization like the Arctic
Council to reduce the perception of Turkey as a protagonist. China is
portrayed by the West as the protagonist in the South China Sea,
while China argues that it is fulfilling its legitimate sovereign rights.
Of all actors involved in the two corresponding regions, Turkey and
9 Emilia Christofi, Negotiations for a Cyprus Settlement, CYPRUS NEWS AGENCY,
http://www.cna.org.cy/webnews-en.aspx?a=a8b114e790954b108ebdd68225c3adb8 (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
10 In addition to apologizing to Turkey, Israel is allowing Turkey to deliver humanitarian
aid to the Palestinians through Israeli ports under the deal. See Oren Liebermann & Elise Labott, Israel, Turkey Strike Deal to Normalize Ties, CNN (June 27, 2016, 3:15 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/26/middleeast/israel-turkey-relations/index.html (last visited
November 5, 2016). The deal also entails an eventual return of ambassadors and initial talks
on a possible natural gas pipeline. Id. Also in exchange, “Turkey will end all criminal or
civil claims against Israeli military personnel and the State of Israel following the 2010 Israeli raid on a Gaza-bound Turkish aid flotilla” known as the Mavi Marmara incident. Id.;
see also Israel Sends $20 Million to Turkey for Families of Mavi Marmara Victims, THE
TIMES OF ISRAEL (Sept. 30, 2016, 6:10 PM), http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-sends-20million-to-turkey-for-families-of-mavi-marmara-victims.
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China are perceived as being a source of grave concern to other
countries in the area due to their greater assertiveness and viewed
hegemonic ambitions before Russia’s intervention in the Syrian conflict in the late summer of 2015. 11
The delimitation of maritime boundaries is governed by a
body of law that has evolved through codification and progressive
development as reflected in treaty provisions. In addition to the
treaties, the decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
various arbitral tribunals have also greatly contributed to its
development. The majority of maritime boundary disputes are
resolved by agreement across the negotiating table. 12 Therefore, the
significance of a state practice should not be overlooked.
Against the backdrop of recent regional developments and
their international implications, the Eastern Mediterranean dispute
over drilling rights off Cyprus’ coasts is closely studied in terms of
laying out the general rules of law relating to maritime delimitation in
the Eastern Mediterranean Sea which has been defined by the
Conventions and by courts as well as by state practice with the
objective to resolve the disputes. Facing the grave challenges by
considering the claims made by the different state regional actors, the
study will analyze approaches to achieve a moderate and balanced
approach based on the assumption that only cooperation and
constructive dialogue can help realize its ambition of being pivotal in
the region and reach a solution to its isolation, even with rival
countries which are not recognized by some of the actors. According
to the relevant provisions of the Conventions, delimitation of the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between States
with opposite or adjacent coasts is to be effected by the agreement.
In the absence of understanding, such a boundary is the line resulting
from the application of equitable principles that produces a fair
outcome, taking into account the circumstances of the area
concerned. At the outset, it should be emphasized that the principles
of delimitation which have been laid down in the Conventions have
11 Elliot Friedland, Turkey, China, Join Syrian Civil War, THE CLARION PROJECT (Aug.
25, 2016), http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/turkey-china-join-syrian-civil-war# (last
visited May 7, 2017); Sam Heller, Russia is in Charge in Syria: How Moscow Took Control
of the Battlefield and Negotiating Table, WAR ON THE ROCKS (June 28, 2016),
https://warontherocks.com/2016/06/russia-is-in-charge-in-syria-how-moscow-took-controlof-the-battlefield-and-negotiating-table/.
12 Anderson, Recent Decision of Courts and Tribunals in Maritime Boundary Cases, in VI
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, at 4119.
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been formulated at a high level of generality. For this reason, it is
difficult to offer any precise account of the principles of delimitation,
which might be applied in the future to unresolved boundaries. Quite
apart from the inherent generality and vagueness of the principles,
each delimitation, including the Eastern Mediterranean delimitation,
involves a situation with unique characteristics which must be taken
into account. Previous decisions and practices will at best point to
the kind of factors to be considered and approaches to be adopted, but
will not permit the deduction of a precise boundary line to be
established but will open the door to a negotiated settlement of disputes in the region.
II.

OVERVIEW TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN AND SOUTH EAST ASIA

The Eastern Mediterranean and South China Sea disputes
over islands’ sovereignty and jurisdiction of maritime zones are flaring up. Maritime boundary delimitation, which belongs to the category of politically sensitive processes, 13 could be used to defuse such
tensions by the states involved. It also could resolve issues including
rights and interests of those states on fishing and marine living resources, mineral and hydrocarbon resources, navigation and other uses of the sea. Today, maritime boundary delimitation agreements
have already been concluded providing a wealth of examples of state
practices. The theoretical total of actual and potential boundaries is
more than 400. Until now 188 maritime boundaries (about half of the
total) have been delimitated while much unrest still continues around
the world about delimitation awaiting some peaceful resolution. 14
13 “ ‘There is no boundary which is not political. The maritime boundary, like the land
boundary, is the fruit of hard negotiations between [coastal] States, or respect of a decision
of an international court. The [International Court of Justice] ICJ observed that: ‘delimitation, whether of a maritime or of a land boundary, is a legal-political operation . . .’ ” See
KIM, supra note 2, at 12; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can./U.S.), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246, ¶ 56 (Oct. 12).
14 Political geographical experts have advised that the theoretical total of actual and potential boundaries is in excess of 400. Gerald H. Blake, World Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The States of Play, in MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND OCEAN RESOURCES 3 (Gerald H.
Blake ed., 1987). In comparison, the six volumes of International Maritime Boundaries,
published between 1993 and 2011, contain reports on 188 boundaries, nearly half of the total. I-III INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Jonathan I. Charney & L.M. Alexander
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Over the years, heightened tension in the Eastern
Mediterranean Sea has escalated potentially into an energy war
because of disputes over drilling rights off Cyprus’ coasts. Turkey
has taken a more assertive role by deploying naval frigates to
accompany research vessels searching for hydrocarbons based on an
agreement with the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus (TRNC)—in
waters considered belonging to the Republic of Cyprus. 15 Also, China has signaled that the Chinese military intends to project power beyond its immediate periphery (China Seas), into the open ocean, in
pursuit of “national rejuvenation” even by the use of force. Its aim is
to counter what Chinese leaders see as U.S.-led efforts to check China’s rise. 16
Although the potential presence of hydrocarbon resources in
both regions opens a great deal of opportunities for closer regional
cooperation, the issue of sovereignty and nationalism often challenge
or even outweigh such prospects. China’s contracting economy
paired with stock-market volatility and corruption have caused China
to deflect attention from the country’s domestic problems by drawing
the ‘nationalist’ card. 17 Incidents have been reported involving the
deployment of naval military assets in the South China Sea over Chinese land reclamation efforts in building artificial islands beyond its
territorial claims in the China Seas. 18 With the Chinese fleet deployed to protect its territorial claims, tensions are rising between the
U.S. and its allies against China in the region 19 while the U.S. counters efforts to limit freedom of navigation by deploying naval frigates
eds., 1993); IV INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Jonathan I. Charney & Robert W.
Smith eds., 2002); V INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (David Colson & Robert W.
Smith eds., 2005); VI INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES (David Colson & Robert W.
Smith eds., 2011).
15 Stephen Glain, Gas Field Off of Cyprus Stokes Tensions with Turkey, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/13/world/middleeast/gas-field-off-of-cyprusstokes-tensions-with-turkey.html.
16 Document: China’s Military Strategy, USNI NEWS (May 26, 2015, 12:13 PM),
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/.
17 Andrew Stevens, China’s Stock Watchdog Admits Market’s Problems, CNN (Jan. 18,
2016, 8:37 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/18/investing/china-stock-market-watchdogcriticism/; see Niall Ferguson, Sinking Globalization, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/20050301faessay_v84n2_ferguson.html?pagewant
ed=print&position.
18 Ben Dolven et al., Chinese Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Implications and
Policy Options, CONG. RES. SERV. (June 18, 2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44072.pdf.
19 Ben Brumfield, U.S. Defense Chief to China: End South China Sea Expansion, CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/30/china/singapore-south-china-sea-ash-carter/.
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through Chinese proclaimed delimited zones. 20
In the Eastern Mediterranean Theater of operations, the prospect of prosperity by commercializing hydrocarbon discoveries has
mixed implications for conflicting territorial claims. Overall the
commercial opportunities to exploit natural resources have negatively
impacted key strategic, regional, political, and military U.S. allies: Israel, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), 21 and Turkey. The RoC and Israel have emerged as gas producers. Their newly discovered gas
provides considerable sovereign wealth offering both a cost-effective
source of energy for their import-dependent energy economies and a
potential high-value source of revenues from gas exports into and be20 Christopher Bodeen & Robert Burns, China Warns U.S. Navy After Ship Sails by ChiFRANCIS
TIMES
(Oct.
28,
2015),
nese-built
Island,
FORT
http://www.fftimes.com/authors/christopher-bodeen-and-robert-burns-associated-press; Phil
Stewart & Nathaniel Taplin, U.S. Navy Sends Warship Near Disputed South China Sea Island, REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2016), https://gcaptain.com/u-s-navy-sends-warship-near-disputedsouth-china-sea-island/#.Vrm6uN-RYWE.
21 See MICHÁLIS STAVROU MICHAEL, RESOLVING THE CYPRUS CONFLICT: NEGOTIATING
HISTORY (2009). In 1960, the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities established
together the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ hereafter referred to as the (RoC). Britain, Greece and
Turkey became guarantors of the country’s independence based on the London and Zürich
Agreements. The most significant and controversial of the treaties was the Treaty of Guarantee, among Cyprus, Britain, Greece and Turkey, to ensure the republic’s “ ‘independence,
territorial integrity, security and respect for its Constitution,’ and prohibited ‘all activity to
promote directly or indirectly either union or partition of the Island.’ ” Id. at 25. In case of a
breach, Britain, Greece and Turkey undertook to consult each other and take the “necessary
steps” needed to rectify the situation. Id. at 26. If “ ‘common or concerted action [was to]
prove impossible, each of the three’ reserved the ‘right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.’ ” Id. With a military coup
on July 15, 1974, staged by Greek-Cypriot nationalists and elements of the Greek military
Junta in an attempt to incorporate Cyprus into Greece, Turkey invaded Cyprus in accordance
with the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee. Colin Smith, Cyprus Divided: 40 Years on, a Family Recalls How the Island was Torn Apart, THE GUARDIAN (July 5, 2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/06/turkish-invasion-divided-cyprus-40-yearson-eyewitness-greek-cypriot-family. A separate state was set up in 1983 called the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) while continuing the search for reconciliation. Elihu
Lauterpacht, The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus-The Status of the Two Communities
in Cyprus, REPUBLIC OF TURKEY MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (July 10, 1990),
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/chapter2.en.mfa. Cyprus is the home of two nations and there exist
two democratically organized states on the island. Id. Although Turkey and TRNC argued
that the Greek Cypriot side had no authority to represent the Turk Cypriots on the behalf of
the whole island, the international community recognized the Greek Cypriot community as
the legitimate representative for all of the island known as the “Republic of Cyprus.” Id. In
this paper, the term “RoC” refers to the Greek Cypriot Administration located in the southern part of the island.
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yond the region. 22 Turkey disputes the rights of the Greek Cypriots
of the RoC to exploit these natural resources without the involvement
of the Turk-Cypriots and perceive it as their responsibility to protect
the rights and interests of the Turk-Cypriots by supporting the selfdeclared TRNC both economically and militarily. 23
Accompanying the rhetoric of protecting the sovereignty and
national interests of people is the perceived coercive strategic expansion of intimidation through the use of naval forces in both regions.
Viewed as power politics by Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean
and the U.S. and China in Eastern Asia, their assertiveness stands out
as apparent hegemonic ambitions fraught with growing tension. Unless diplomatic solutions are found to resolve the different interpretations of delimitation of maritime law, the same tensions in the South
China Sea may expand and develop in the Eastern Mediterranean
Sea. The implications of the EEZ 24 claims need to be sorted out according to international law of the sea. If a ‘Joint Maritime Development Regime,’ 25 modeled after the Arctic Council, is not established
to arbitrate maritime boundary disputes, both conflicts now have the
potential of escalating into another Persian Gulf Crisis.
Resolving the regional disputes among states in the Eastern
Mediterranean and the China Seas, need to be accomplished diplomatically. General rules of law about maritime delimitation as laid
down by international conventions, courts, as well as state practice,
must be respected. Facing these serious challenges are countries in
the Eastern Mediterranean and the South China Sea, which are rivals
22 Laura El-Katiri & Dr. Mohammed El-Katiri, Executive Summary: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, STRATEGIC STUD. INST.,
http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/files/1243-summary.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
23 See generally TCA Fact Sheet: H. Res. 676 (Cyprus Dispute), TCA, http://www.tcamerica.org/resource-center/tca-fact-sheet-h-res-676-cyprus-dispute-702.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2017).
24 An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a sea zone prescribed by the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea over which a state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind.
UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 56. It stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles
(nm) from its coast. UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 57. See also Ayla Gürel & Laura Le
Cornu, Turkey and Eastern Mediterranean Hydrocarbons, GLOBAL POL. TRENDS CTR.
ISTANBUL
KULTUR
U.,
http://www.
gpotcenter.org/
dosyalar/trhydrocarbons_gurel_lecornu_2013.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2017).
25 Joint development regime embraces a state to convey some of its sovereign rights to a
supra-national authority which is responsible to regulate the exploration for and exploitation
of natural resources on the continental shelf, as well as the living resources and other uses of
superjacent waters.
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and have no diplomatic relations. 26 Territorial claimant countries like
Turkey and the divided Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and
China and many neighboring countries in the China Seas are all in
need of brokering a settlement.
The United States, China, and countries in both regions must
go beyond the heated rhetoric. Different moderate and balanced approaches are required based on cooperation and constructive dialog to
reach solutions to the territorial disputes to avoid escalating tensions
in the Eastern Mediterranean and South China Sea into a far more
dangerous situation that will prove difficult to reverse. 27 An explicit
commitment and finely grained understanding of concerns, intentions
and consequences are needed by the region’s leaders to improve human security by alleviating human deprivation and protecting the
people’s health and welfare in the area. The aim is to avoid a potential escalation of tensions by accepting legal judgments about the delimitation of maritime boundaries and thus begin a process of achieving peace and prosperity.
III.

THE NEED FOR MARITIME DELIMITATION

Historically, states rarely delimited their maritime boundaries
with other states. In fact, “[o]ne of Shakespeare’s characters in The
Tempest said he ‘would give a thousand furlongs of sea for an acre of
barren ground.’ These days things are different: an acre of sea or
seabed may be more valuable in some respects than an acre of the
best ground.” 28
Therefore, this situation has changed in recent years.
“Economic considerations as well as political and security factors
26 James Holmes, Why Are Chinese and Russian Ships Prowling the Mediterranean?,
FOREIGN POL. (May 15, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/15/china-russia-navy-jointsea-2015-asia-pivot-blowback/.
27 China has long urged to organize an effort to promote the joint exploration of seabed
resources without prejudice to sovereignty with other claimant regional states, as has already
been done by Malaysia and Thailand (1979), Malaysia and Vietnam (1992), and Malaysia
and Brunei (2009). Michael Swaine, Averting a Deepening U.S.-China Rift Over the South
China Sea, CHINA-U.S. FOCUS (June 5, 2015), http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreignpolicy/averting-a-deepening-u-s-china-rift-over-the-south-china-sea.
28 David Anderson, Maritime Delimitation: Early British Practice, in MODERN LAW OF
THE SEA: SELECTED ESSAYS 437 (2008) [hereinafter MODERN LAW OF THE SEA]; see also
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 1, sc. 1.
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have made the delimitation of maritime boundaries an important
issue for many governments.” 29

30

Figure-1: RoC-Egypt, RoC-Israel, and RoC-Lebanon EEZ borders, RoC license exploration blocks.
The commercial exploitation of these natural resources often
requires that operators be allocated specifically defined areas to explore and exploit. States became strongly motivated to claim new
maritime zones within their jurisdiction. 31 States began to claim
boundaries further seawards from their traditional 12-mile territorial
sea zone with other countries to maximize the commercialization of
natural resources over which they have exclusive authority. 32
Because of the geographical proximity of many
states, their maritime zones often overlap to a greater
29 Id. Perhaps the primary force behind the move to establish these boundaries has been
the development of technology to recover highly valuable hydrocarbons and other non-living
resources of seabed and subsoil. Jonathan I. Charney, Introduction, in I INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at xxiii.
30 Akin Unver, Beyond a Turkish-Greek Problem, FOREIGN POL. ASS’N (Sept. 28, 2011),
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/09/28/beyond-a-turkish-greek-problem/ (last visited May
12, 2017) (illustrating the Cyprus oil and gas drilling).
31 Guillermo Hierrezuelo Conde, La Postura Española en la Tercera Conferencia de las
Naciones Unidas Sobre el Derecho del Mar con Respecto al Mar Territorial, ENCICLOPEDIA
VIRTUAL, http://www.eumed.net/libros-gratis/ 2015/1432/espacios-marinos.htm (last visited
July 18, 2015).
32 Id.
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or lesser extent. There is therefore a need for boundaries between such zones in order to avoid disputes and
uncertainties over the right to exercise sovereignty,
sovereign rights or jurisdiction and to exploit resources. 33
As a result, “[t]he significance of maritime boundaries in international relations grew in the . . . second half of the twentieth century.” 34
The limits of sovereignty and title to resources
involve delicate political and security issues. The
risks involved in boundary disputes are often high: one
need only recall Lord Curzon’s dictum: ‘frontiers are
the razor’s edge on which hang suspended . . . issues
of war and peace . . . .’ “ The existence of overlapping
claims may inadvertently lead to disputes . . .. Overlapping claims may be akin to accidents waiting to
happen. For this reason alone, establishing maritime
boundaries is an important task for coastal States. 35

33 Aiman Rahman Khan, Impacts of the Bangladesh v Myanmar Case Regarding Delimiation
of
Maritime
Boundary
(unpublished
LL.M.
paper),
https://www.academia.edu/15062794/Impacts_of_the_Bangladesh_v_Myanmar_case_regard
ing_Delimitation_of_Maritime_Boundary (last visited July 18, 2015); see also R.R. Churchill & A.V. Lowe, THE LAW OF THE SEA 181 (3d ed. 1999).. There are three typical situations
in which states seek to agree on maritime boundaries:
The first situation arises where substantial activities subject to
costal state jurisdiction are conducted o r are likely to be conducted
in an area of actual or potential dispute . . . .

The second situation prompting a delimitation agreement arises
where one or both states wish to stimulate uses, particularly fixed uses,
of the area in question . . .
The third situation . . . arises when governments seek to agree on
a maritime boundary despite the absence of significant activity or interest
in the region requiring a boundary.
Bernard H. Oxman, International Maritimee Boundaries: Political, Strategic, and Historical
Consideration, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 243 (1994).
34 DAVID ANDERSON, Negotiating Maritime Boundary Agreements, in MODERN LAW OF
THE SEA, supra note 28, at 417.
35 DAVID ANDERSON, Negotiating Maritime Boundary Agreements, in MODERN LAW OF
THE SEA, supra note 28, at 418, 418 n.4 (“Lord Curzon of Kedleston’s words, uttered in
1908, provided the title for a collection of essays in honor of Professor Gerald Blake of the
International Boundaries Research Unit of the University of Durham”) (“[I]f fishermen from
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THE LAWS OF MARITIME DELIMITATION

The body of law governing the delimitation of maritime
boundaries was perpetuated by a new international economic order.
It required codification and progressive development of principles
and norms according to international law as exemplified in treaty
provisions. 36 The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and ad hoc tribunals has significantly contributed to its development, as well as state practice. 37 The conventions, both the 1958
Geneva Conventions and 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), rightly called “a Constitution for the Ocean,”
have made significant contributions to developing general rules and
principles to guide States in the drawing of boundaries. 38 In addition
to the Conventions, customary law in this matter has been extensively
developed through decisions of the ICJ and various arbitral
tribunals. 39
Quite apart from the inherent generality and vagueness of the
principles, each delimitation either in the Eastern Mediterranean or
the South China Sea, involves a situation that has its unique characteristics. In this context, the delimitation of the continental shelf and
EEZ between littoral states in the China and Eastern Mediterranean
Seas shall be effected by ‘agreement’ of international law taking account of all the relevant circumstances to achieve an ‘equitable
solution.’ Previous decisions and practice will at best point to the
kind of factors to be considered and approach to be adopted, but will
not permit the deduction of a precise boundary line that must be
established. 40
V.

RISING TENSION IN THE CHINA SEA

The East and South China Seas are troubled areas of
international tension because of overlapping territorial claims. In the
one side are arrested by the coastguard of the other side or if traces of oil are discovered in
an area of overlapping claims.”).
36 G.A. Res. 41/73 (Dec. 3, 1986).
37 Jonathan I. Charney, Progress in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation Law,
88 AM. J. INT’L L. 227-28 (1994).
38 David Anderson, Recent Decision of Courts and Tribunals in Maritime Boundary Cases, in VI INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 12, at 4119.
39 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 33, at 181.
40 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 33, at 182.
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East China Sea, China and Japan are both claiming a group of islands
with Taiwan making a separate claim. Japan calls them the Senkaku
Islands; China calls them the Diaoyu Islands and they are known as
the Tiaoyutai Islands in Taiwan. 41 The territorial dispute between
China and Japan has been going on more than 100 years dating back
to the end of the nineteenth century to the Sino-Japanese War of
1894, while Japan’s defeat in World War II and Cold War
geopolitics added complexity to claims over the island. 42
China is expanding its territorial claim in the South China Sea
through reclamation efforts by building artificial islands and
increasing its naval support of Beijing’s geopolitical objectives.43
Former U.S. President Barack Obama and leaders of the countries in
the South China Sea agree that easing tensions is needed to resolve
any territorial disputes through legal means “where international rules
and norms and the rights of all nations, large and small, are
upheld.” 44 Reports, which China denies, 45 have gone as far as to deploy an advanced surface-to-air missile system to the disputed
Woody Island, a part of the Paracel Islands chain, it has controlled in
the South China Sea for more than forty years but also is claimed by
Taiwan and Vietnam. 46

41 Mark E. Manyin, The Senkakus (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations,
CONG. RES. SERV. (Oct. 14, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf.
42 Tadashi Ikeda, Getting Senkaku History Right, THE DIPLOMAT, (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.thediplomat.com/2013/11/getting-senkaku-history-right/3/.
43 China’s
Maritime Dispute, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 2017),
http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/?cid=otrmarketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide.
44 Jeff Mason & Bruce Wallace, Obama, ASEAN Discuss South China Sea Tensions, But
No Joint Mention of China, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2016, 5:01 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-asean-idUSKCN0VP1F7.
45 Patricia Loudres Viray, China Denies Sending Missiles to Disputed Island, PHIL. STAR,
(Feb. 17, 2016, 3:34 PM), http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/02/17/1554039/chinadenies-sending-missiles-disputed-island.
46 J.R.Wu & Andrea Shalal, China Sends Missiles to Contested South China Sea Island:
Taiwan, REUTERS, (Feb. 17, 2016, 3:50 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/southchinaseachina-idUSL3N15W1JP.
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47

Figure-2: Artificial Island
The Senkaku/Diaoyu issue (See Figure-3) highlights the more robust
attitude China has been taking to its territorial claims in both the East
China Sea and the South China Sea. 48 It poses worrying questions
about regional security as China’s military modernizes amid the US
“pivot” to Asia. In both China and Japan, meanwhile, the dispute
ignites nationalist passions on both sides, putting pressure on
politicians to appear tough and ultimately making any possible
resolution even harder. Former President Obama has confirmed that
the security pact with Japan 49 applies to the islands – but has also
warned that escalation of the current row would harm all sides.

47 Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, China’s Island Factory, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2014),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-1446c419-fc55-4a07-9527-a6199f5dc0e2.
48 Why
is the South China Sea Contentious? BBC (July 12, 2016),
http://www.bbc.combbccom/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349; see also “How Uninhabitated
Islands
Soured
China-Japan
Ties,”
BBC
(
Nov.
10,
2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11341139; http://www.bbc.com//world-asiapacific-11341139.
49 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN (Jan. 19, 1960),
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html. The U.S. and Japan forged a
security alliance in the wake of World War II and formalized it in 1960. Id. Under the deal,
the U.S. is given military bases in Japan in return for its promise to defend Japan in the event
of an attack. Beina Xu, The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. (July 1,
2014), http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437. This means if conflict
were to erupt between China and Japan, Japan would expect U.S. military back-up. Id.
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50

Figure-3: Dispute between Japan and China over Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands
In the case of the South China Sea, the Philippines, Republic
of China (Taiwan), Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam are principally
affected by China’s claim to vast swaths of the South China Sea also
referred to as the 9-dash line and the Spratly Islands some which are
distinct from the sovereignty of certain islands, maritime zones and
the sea’s resources under the national jurisdiction of such recognized
states. (See Figure-4) The area and disputes in the South China Sea
are also preferably designated by the countries in the region as
‘Southeast Asia’ to avoid the name of China.

50

JAPANFOCUS, http://japanfocus.org/data/43412.gif (last visited Apr. 13, 2017).
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51

Figure-4: China and other Country Territorial Claims
Arbitration of all of these maritime boundary disputes are required to make judgments about the EEZ claims of international law.
A ‘Joint Maritime Development Regime,’ modeled on the Arctic
Council, would provide a forum to find diplomatic solutions based on
arbitration instead of countries taking decisive or hostile actions to
protect their claimed rights. China’s unwillingness to clearly state its
intent to lay claim to waters around man-made (artificial) islands and
other waters could be better communicated and managed through
such a Joint Development Regime. Instead of Washington and others
calling on Beijing to repeatedly clarify its stance on the “nine-dashedline” (9DL), which is the demarcation line used by the People’s
Republic of China’s claims to major parts of the China Sea, a
51 VOA, http://blogs.voanews.com/state-department-news/files/2012/07/BB-South-ChinaSea-Rev3.jpg (last visited May 1, 2017).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

19

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 [2017], Art. 10

846

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

framework would exist to discuss and negotiate these issues based on
Law of the Sea.
Two years ago, Beijing warned a Philippine military aircraft
to leave areas around the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. 52 On
May 21, 2015, the Chinese navy warned a U.S. surveillance plane to
leave Chinese airspace when flying over newly made islands publicly
challenging Chinese island-building on disputed reefs and shoals in
the South China Sea. 53 These incidents created new tension in a potential global tinderbox as both U.S. and China shift forces into the
area to protect their maritime interests. 54 Former U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter called for “an immediate and lasting halt” 55 to the
practice. In a speech to diplomats in Singapore, he said, “the
prospect of further militarization as well as the potential for these
activities to increase the risk of miscalculation or conflict among
claimant states.” 56
The Chinese Ministry of Defense issued a white paper titled,
“Chinese Military Strategy” 57 which vowed to strengthen its naval
power in support of Beijing’s geopolitical objectives by safeguarding
China’s maritime rights and interests. The document clearly indicted
the U.S. (and other neighbors) for taking “provocative actions” surrounding Chinese reefs and islands. China “reinforce[s] their military
presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied.” 58
Bellicose remarks accompanied the white paper and current
events involving the U.S. sending aircraft carriers and warships into
the South China Sea to demonstrate its dominant military power in
52 Manuel Mogato, China is Ordering Philippine Military Planes to get Away from Disputed Areas of the South China Sea, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 7, 2015, 6:13 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/china-orders-philippine-military-to-leave-disputed-areas-ofsouth-china-sea-2015-5.
53 Jim Sciutto, China Warns U.S. Surveillance Plane, CNN (Sept. 15, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/20/politics/south-china-sea-navy-flight/index.html.
54 Id.
55 Ben Brumfield, U.S. Defense Chief to China: End South China Sea Expansion, CNN,
updated May 30, 2015, 10:31 AM). http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/30/china/singapore-southchina-sea-ash-carter/index.html.
56 Id.
57 Document:
China’s Military Strategy, USNI NEWS (May 26, 2015),
https://news.usni.org/2015/05/26/document-chinas-military-strategy.
58 Id.
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the region in the latest episode in a wary standoff between the U.S.
and China over the two contested Parcels and the Spratly Island
chains. 59 U.S. officials and military officers pledge to fight to defend
U.S. interests while many Chinese believe Beijing must now more
than ever not back down and demonstrate to the U.S. and others that
it will not be intimidated. These tensions risk regional and global
peace and prosperity.
Sino-U.S. relations are at a critical stage of being derailed into
an adversarial global conflict because of a few rocks and islands in
the corner of the Asia-Pacific region. A commitment by both Washington and Beijing is required to clarify their claims and grievances
by addressing:
1) [W]hether man-made islands can be used to justify
12 nm territorial seas and EEZs that can be used to
limit naval access; 2) [W]hether a coastal state with
EEZs can demand that foreign militaries notify them
before transiting or engaging in [activities within
EEZ]; and 3) [Whether] the threat and resort to force
over disputed territories or violations [of EEZ zones’
natural resources are legally justifiable]. 60
About point 1), Man-made – “artificial islands, installations,
and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no
territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the
delimitation of the territorial sea, the [EEZ] or the continental
shelf.” 61 According to customary international law and the Law of
the Sea Convention 1982 (“LOSC”) relating to continental shelf, a
coastal state has sovereign rights ‘ipso facto’ and ‘ab initio.’ 62 It
does not depend on occupation or expressed proclamation to a continental shelf, which in any event shall not exceed 350 nm from the
baselines. Also, a coastal state is entitled to claim an EEZ of a
breadth of 200 nm. In these zones, the coastal state has exclusive
59

Michael Forsythe & Jane Perlez, Step by Step, China Expands its Military in Disputed
TIMES
OF
INDIA
(Mar.
9,
2016,
10:51
PM),
Sea,
THE
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/Step-by-step-China-expands-its-military-indisputed-sea/articleshow/51333509.cms.
60 Michael D. Swaine, Averting a Deepening U.S.-China Rift Over the South China
Sea,CARNEGIE: ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE (June 2, 2015),
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/06/02/averting-deepening-u.s.-china-rift-over-southchina-sea-pub-60274.
61 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 60.
62 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 77.
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sovereign rights to explore and exploit natural resources either living
or non-living which include the waters adjacent to the seabed, and of
the seabed and the subsoil in its seabed. 63
Consequently, other states cannot make assertions over the
natural resources in another country’s maritime zones. Nevertheless,
in both the continental shelf and the EEZ the freedom of navigation
shall not be hindered as those waters, in essence, form part of the
high seas. 64 It is a trade-off between the viewpoints of the great maritime powers and the smaller coastal states. Major sea-faring countries were reluctant to concede expansion of state jurisdiction over the
high seas while the smaller coastal states sought extended maritime
rights to safeguard the natural resources of their sea waters.
As to point b) several coastal nations including China perceive the entering of foreign navies into the EEZ as hostile acts to
conduct surveillance activities. China insists that it has the legal
right, under the regulations of UNCLOS, to deny foreign navies free
access in its EEZ. The U.S. and many other countries reject this interpretation. 65
63

UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 55-58.
UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 56, 78; see Sami Doğru, Uluslararası Hukukta Seyrüsefer Serbestliği ve Deniz Güvenliği/Freedom of Navigation and Maritime Security in International Law 125 (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ankara University).
65 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 58. According to Art. 58 of UNCLOS, all states,
whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the freedoms of navigation and overflight in EEZ:
Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone
64

1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or landlocked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the
freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated
with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines,
and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply
to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible
with this Part.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to
the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws
and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far
as they are not incompatible with this Part.
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Finally, an unprovoked threat or use of force would constitute
a clear violation of the UN Charter prohibiting such behavior according to UN Charter Chapter VII. Any sustained attempt by China to
forcibly threaten or remove other claimants from disputed territories
without any clear threat requiring selfdefense would seriously disrupt
peace accompanied by a strong regional and international outcry.
Beijing’s choice to not clearly communicate its disavowal of
unauthorized use of force undermines regional trust with the West
and many regional powers. The introduction of China’s white paper
to use force has altered its ‘peaceful development’ policy to a policy
of territorial aggrandizement for the sake of security—jeopardizing
its relations with the West and many regional states.
At present, there seems little support for adopting a binding
Code of Conduct to avoid future incidents of military confrontation.
The United States and China must build the basis for demilitarizing
and defusing the escalating tensions in the China Sea. Unless actions
are initiated to alter the current course of events, the U.S.-Sino relation threatens to escalate into a far more dangerous situation that will
prove difficult to reverse.
VI.

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN CONUNDRUM OF
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

Eastern Mediterranean regional peace and maritime stability
are jeopardized by two of the most prolonged religious/ethnic border
conflicts: the Arab-Israeli and Cyprus conflicts. Both conflicts involve disputes over territorial claims and disputed boundaries and the
ownership of hydrocarbon resources. In other words, the Cyprus
conflict is a dispute today about the maritime jurisdiction of areas in
the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and no longer about an island divided
by a green line patrolled by the United Nations’ peacekeeping
troops. 66 TRNC, Turkey, and Lebanon have all staked claims in the
gas fields conflicting with or raising legal objections by other parties
involving disputes relating to the Aegean Sea and delimitation of the
continental shelf. All these disputes affect relations among the
neighbors of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. 67
SERTAÇ HAMI BAŞEREN, DOĞU AKDENIZ DENIZ YETKI ALANLARI UYUŞMAZLIĞI
(DISPUTES OVER EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN MARITIME JURISDICTION AREAS) 176 (2010).
67 Laura El-Katiri & Mohammed El-Katiri, Regionalizing Eastern Mediterranean Gas:
Energy Security, Stability, and the U.S. Role, STRATEGIC STUD. INST. (Dec. 2014),
66
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68

Figure-5: Disputed Maritime Territory and Prospective Gas
Fields
The predicament about maritime jurisdictional zones’ disputes
surrounding Cyprus began in 2003 when the RoC concluded an EEZ
delimitation agreement with Egypt. Two more delineations followed
with Lebanon in 2007—awaiting ratification—and Israel in 2010. 69
However, the energy security speculation did not leapfrog until significant offshore hydrocarbon discoveries were made in Cyprus and
Israel (the Tamar in 2009 and the Leviathan in 2010) together with a
2010 U.S. Geological Survey. 70 The report suggested that the Levant
Basin could hold up to 122 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas and
up to 1.7 billion barrels of oil. 71 The geological survey considered
one-third of the region’s potential natural resources from the RoC’s
and Israel’s maritime zones to some coastal and offshore territories of
Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian Territories. Two-thirds remained
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1243.pdf.
68 CIMSEC, http://cimsec.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/gas2.png (last visited Apr. 30,
2017).
69 Id.
70 Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the Levant Basin Province,
Eastern Mediterranean, USGS 1 (Mar. 2010), https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS103014.pdf.
71 Id.
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undiscovered. Only then did energy experts begin to discuss gas
transit opportunities for the region. 72 Two transport options were
considered to carry the gas: “[S]hipping liquefied natural gas (LNG)
to the Mediterranean Sea, or building a gas pipeline that runs from
the north of Israel to Turkey and then onwards to Europe.” 73
Due to the diplomatic relations between Turkey and the gas
exporting countries in the region, it was highly unlikely that a pipeline through Turkey would be built 74 until news arrived that the Turkish and Israeli governments were poised to renew full diplomatic relations after years of tension. 75 Even the downing of a Russian
military aircraft over Turkish airspace in October 2015 had farreaching economic and commercial repercussions, including Russia’s
ban of most fruit and vegetable imports from Turkey, as well as its
halt of the flow of millions of Russian tourists to Turkey. While
Russia continued gas sales to Turkey, “the countries’ $30 billion in
annual trade decreased by 43 percent.” In an attempt to normalize
relations, Turkish President Erdogan offered an apology to Russian
President Putin, which Putin had demanded for the downing of the
Russian jet. 76
After the July 15, 2016 coup d’état attempt in Turkey, efforts
to restore ties between Russia and Turkey accelerated as President
Putin was the first leader to offer his support for Turkey. According
to President Erdogan, “[i]t was very important from a mental perspective, this kind of psychological support,” especially when com-

72 Sarah Vogler & Eric V. Thompson, Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Implications for Regional Maritime Security, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND (Mar. 2015),
www.gmfus.org/file/4519/download.
73 Olgu Okumus, Eastern Mediterranean Energy Sources Sunk by Political Waters, NAT.
GAS WORLD (Dec. 24, 2012, 12:15 AM), http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/easternmediterranean-energy-sources-sunk-by-political-waters; List of Actions Selected for Receiving Financial Assistance Under the First CEF Energy 2015 Call for Proposals, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/CEF_Energy_2015_call_for_proposal
s.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2017). The EU has requested that a feasibility study be completed
involving a gas pipeline route from Cyprus to Greece Mainland via Crete. List of Actions
Selected for Receiving Financial Assistance Under the First CEF Energy 2015 Call for Proposals, supra.
74 Okumus, supra note 73.
75 Don Nissenbaum, Israel, Turkey Poised to Renew Diplomatic Relations; Secret Talks in
Switzerland May Restore Ties Suspended Since 2010 Raid on Gaza-Bound Aid Ship, WALL
STREET J. (Dec. 18, 2015 1:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/israel-turkey-poised-torenew-diplomatic-relations-1450438539.
76 Id.
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pared to former President Obama, who called much later offering his
support “amid accusations that the United States played a role in the
failed coup in Turkey” and Turkey’s “widespread resentment of the
White House’s criticism of the resulting crackdown.” 77 When both
leaders President Putin and President Erdogan met in August 2016,
their focus was to repair relations to its pre-crisis level.
Against this backdrop, the friendly talks between these two
historical antagonists raised alarm bells as Turkey is a member of
NATO and essential to Europe’s efforts to halt the massive flow of
refugees from Syria and Afghanistan. Tensions between Washington
and Ankara rose due to American support of PYD/YPG in Syria 78
and Iraq, as well as “President Obama’s reluctance to hand over Fethullah Gulen, a reclusive Muslim cleric living in Pennsylvania
whom [President] Erdogan ha[d] accused of leading the coup attempt” 79on July 15, 2016. Without the due process of law in accordance with extradition treaties between both countries, growing antiAmericanism in Turkey could ultimately benefit Moscow’s interest
“to draw Turkey into its orbit and into the security and trade organizations it is promoting in Asia.” 80 Yet, despite the pledges both
heads of state made to work together, Syria remains a “major
potential fault line” because both sides view Syria’s President Bashar
al-Assad differently. President Erdogan sees him as a “bitter enemy”
of Turkey while President Putin regards al-Assad as a longtime ally
of Russia and has even “intervened with Iran in the Syrian conflict”
to strengthen his country’s role in the region and secure Syria as Russia’s base of operations. 81
In October 2016, President Putin visited Istanbul to accelerate
reconciliation between Russia and Turkey by signing an agreement to
77 Neil MacFarquhar, Russia and Turkey Vow to Repair Ties as West Watches Nervously,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/10/world/europe/putinerdogan-russia-turkey.html.
78 YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel/Kurdish People’s Protection Units) is the military arm of
the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat/Democratic Union Party) considered by the Turkish
government as the Syrian affiliate of the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê/Kurdistan
Workers’ Party) recognized as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the U.S. and a number of
allied governments and organizations
79 Supra note 77.
80 Supra note 77.
81 Id.
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revive the suspended Turkish Stream natural-gas pipeline project
which was “to run under the Black Sea to Turkey and then the Greek
border.” 82 The pipeline would allow Russian gas to reach the West
by circumventing Eastern Europe and also allow “Russia to cut off
gas supplies to neighboring countries like Ukraine without disrupting
sales to countries farther west like Italy or Austria.” 83 The revived
Turkish Stream gas pipeline project would “replace a planned pipeline through Bulgaria that the EU blocked at the outset of the Ukraine
crisis.” 84 The agreement to build the pipeline also included “a reduction in the price that Gazprom, the Russian natural gas giant, would
charge for natural gas sold on Turkey’s domestic market,” 85 which
Russia has been trying for years to establish. However, the Turkish
Stream project was opposed by a few European governments, as well
as the United States. With the mounting tension with Russia and the
geopolitical shifts, the region’s energy security came to the forefront
and current outlooks were re-evaluated to avoid dependency on a single major provider of energy and consider diversification of sources
of upstream energy.
The discoveries of hydrocarbon energy have prompted states
with a direct claim to the Levant Basin to commercialize their energy
sectors. By creating the legislation to attract bids from companies to
explore and exploit the oil and hydrocarbons within the proclaimed
EEZs, the RoC and Israel have emerged as major regional gas producers. Both countries control cost-effective sources of energy for
their import-dependent economies, as well as a potential high-value
source of revenue from hydrocarbon exports to and beyond the region. 86 The potential wealth derived from the exploration and development of the natural resources has catalysed tensions in the Cyprus
conflict. Issues of sovereign wealth derived from energy resources
have raised alarm bells suggesting that these revenues belong to both
Turk- and Greek-Cypriots and not only those living in the RoC.

82 Neil MacFarquhar, Warming Relations in Person, Putin and Erdogan Revive Pipeline
TIMES
(Oct.
10,
2016),
Deal,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/11/world/europe/turkey-russia-vladimir-putin-receptayyip-erdogan.html.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Sarah Vogler & Eric V. Thompson, Gas Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean:
Implications for Regional Maritime Security, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND (Mar. 2015),
www.gmfus.org/file/4519/download.
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Besides the regional tensions in Cyprus and deterioration of
Turkish-Israeli relations since 2011, peace and security are advancing
in tandem with trilateral cooperation among Israel-RoC-Greece and
Egypt-RoC-Greece over security and energy. In the past year, Israel
and RoC signed with Egypt a Memorandum of Understanding
(‘MOU’) believing they could step in to alleviate Egypt’s falling production levels. 87 However, Italian oil firm ENI announced on August
30, 2015, that it had discovered the largest known natural gas deposit
in the Eastern Mediterranean off the coast of Egypt. 88 The findings
are a significant game changer and could lead to the annulment of the
MOU agreements that Israel and the RoC signed with Egypt. The
discovery means that in upcoming years countries in Europe like Italy, as well as the Asian market and eventually Jordan, which plan to
build their regasification terminals to handle LNG are the most important export markets for Egypt. 89 It delivers a stunning blow to the
Israeli and Greek Cypriot economies, as well as the gas partners Delek Drilling and Noble Energy as they previously managed the only
discoveries in the region, which included Tamar, Leviathan, Karish
and Tanin in Israel and Aphrodite in Cyprus. 90 Delek Dilling and
Noble Energy had hoped to recoup some of their investments with
the delivery of gas to Egypt.
For the consortiums, a total strategic re-evaluation is needed
for the European market and where it still has a competitive advantage. Cairo’s energy security will improve the chances of government stability benefitting Israel, which “wants to see the military
remain the core pillar of the Egyptian state.” 91
87 Gal Luft, Will Egypt’s Zohr Gas Field Sink Israel’s Leviathan?, MIDDLE EAST F. (Aug.
31, 2015), http://www.meforum.org/5463/zohr-leviathan.
88 Id. The gas field Zohr is estimated to to be “thirty percent larger than the Israeli Leviathan field” with the “potential of 30 trillion cubic feet of gas” and is easier to develop because it is much shallower than Leviathan. Id. Also, it is not expected to face any major regulatory obstacles before development begins in early 2017, making Egypt energy
independent while the commercialization of Leviathan is sill held up by Israeli politics. Id.
89 Id.
90 Luft, supra note 87.
91 Energy Security Will Not Cure All of Egypt’s Ills, NAT. GAS WORLD (Sept. 7, 2015),
https://www.naturalgasworld.com/energy-security-will-not-cure-all-of-egypts-ills25301?utm_%20source=Natural+%20Gas+Europe+Newsletter&utm_campaign=540a54ae8
7-RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN&utm_medium=%20email&utm%20_term=0_c95c702d4c540a54ae87-307796221.
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REACTION BY THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY - ESCALATION OF
TENSION

Turkey, as a non-party to UNCLOS, objected to the RoC EEZ
delimitation agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, and Israel. 92 It claims
as a de-facto divided island that the Greek-Cypriot community cannot
represent the island as the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ until reunified to establish a single EEZ. 93 Due to conflicting claims by the Greek- and
Turk-Cypriot communities regarding maritime delimitation within
the broader context of reconciliation and bi-communal negotiations,
Turkey finds that exploitation of natural resources should be deferred
until a comprehensive ‘Cyprus Settlement’ is reached, as the resources around the island belong to both communities and must be
shared equitably. Although the international community position relating to sharing the sovereign wealth generated by commercializing
natural resources is unclear, it is commonly accepted “that offshore
natural resources belong to both communities.” 94
Turkey perceives the concluded unilateral delimitation
agreements between the RoC and other coastal countries as an infringement of international law and a border clash in the Eastern
Mediterranean basin. 95 The Lebanese also perceive the Israeli-RoC
agreement delineating an EEZ between the country’s joint maritime
Mediterranean frontiers a violation of Lebanon’s sovereign and economic territorial rights that “jeopardizes peace and security in the region.” 96
92 Sami Doğru, Doğu Akdeniz’de Hidrokarbon Kaynakları ve Uluslararası Hukuka Göre
Bölgedeki Kıta Sahanlığı ve Münhasır Ekonomik Bölge Alanlarının Sınırlandırılması/Hydrocarbon Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf in the Region According to International Law,
TURKISH
B.
ASS’N
REV.
503,
514-15
(2015),
119
UNION
http://tbbdergisi.barobirlik.org.tr/m2015-119-1503.
93 Id.
94 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 13.
95 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 10-11.
96 Andreas Filis & Rafael Leal-Arcas, Legal Aspects of Inter-State Maritime Delimitation
in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin, 11 OIL, GAS & ENERGY L. INTELLIGENCE 1, 3 (2013),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2257731; Charles Kennedy, Lebanon Protests Israeli-Cypriot Energy Agreement, OILPRICE (June 21, 2011, 6:31 PM), http://oilprice.com/Latest-EnergyNews/World-News/Lebanon-Protests-Israeli-Cypriot-Energy-Agreement.html “Lebanon’s
Minister of Foreign Affairs Adnan Mansour has sent an official letter of protest to UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressing Lebanon’s objection to a bilateral Israeli-Cypriot
agreement delineating an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) between the country’s joint maritime Mediterranean frontiers. Mansour wrote that the agreement bilateral between Israel and
Cyprus ‘violates Lebanon’s sovereign and economic rights and jeopardizes peace and securi-
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Turkey’s position regarding EEZ delimitation is based on the
‘equity’ principle that calls for consideration of ‘special
circumstances’ to respect ‘proportionality’ and ‘non-encroachment’
rules. 97 Given the more than 20 times difference between coastal
lengths of Cyprus and Turkey, the EEZ of Cyprus should be coextensive with its 12-mile-wide Territorial Waters according to the Turkish
view. “Safe access to high seas and the underlying economic resources of the seabed are of key significance to sustain Turkey’s high
rate of economic growth. As a regional powerhouse, Turkey tries to
reap the lion’s share of natural gas trade to become an energy supplier and transit hub.” 98
Continental shelf delimitation line
between Turkey and TRNC
Coastal length of Turkey subject to delimitation area

Coastal length of RoC subject to
delimitation area delimitation line

99

Figure-6: Turkey’s Disputed Delimitation of Coastal Lines with
RoC
VIII. REACTION BY THE TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN
ty in the region.’ ”
97 Serhat S. Çubukçuoğlu, The EEZ Delimitation Dispute Between Cyprus and Turkey –
Part I 3-5 (The Fletcher School Tufts University) (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.academia.edu/9532415/Cyprus_and_Turkey_The_EEZ_Delimitation_Dispute_i
n_the_Eastern_Mediterranean_-_Part_I.
98 Id. at 5.
99 Sertaç Hami Başeren, “Disputes over Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction Areas/ Doğu Akdeniz Deniz Yetki Alanları Uyuşmazlığı,” Stratejik Araştırmalar, 8(14), January
2010, p. 171.
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CYPRUS (TRNC)—ESCALATION OF TENSION
The Turkish Cypriot government (TRNC) denounced the unilateral proclamation of the Greek Cypriot (RoC) government EEZ on
behalf of the entire island. This denunciation expressed that the
extraterritorial rights over extracting offshore energy reserves included in the bilateral agreements of Greek Cypriots with third parties
were null and void.
The Eastern Mediterranean Basin exhibits an ever-increasing
amount of tension through the disagreement between Greek- and
Turk-Cypriots about exploration rights around the island. According
to Turkey and TRNC, tensions are increased in the region because:
- Greek Cypriots do not represent the Island as a
whole,
- “The Turkish Cypriots, who are the co-owners of the
island of Cyprus, have equal, and inalienable rights
over the exploration; extraction and processing of
natural resources found within the maritime
jurisdiction areas of the Island,” 100
- The maritime delimitation in a semi-enclosed sea
like the Eastern Mediterranean could only be possible
through arrangements to be made among all the
countries concerned and by observing the rights and
interests of all the parties.
- “Consequently, neither the legislation adopted nor
the bilateral agreements concluded by the Greek
Cypriot Authorities have any effect.
- In addition, it must also be kept in mind that Turkey
has legitimate and legal rights and interests in the
Eastern Mediterranean” in the same exploration area
claimed by the Greek Cypriots which overlap with

100 Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Nov. 28, 2013), http://mfa.gov.ct.tr/statement-by-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairsof-theturkish-republic-of-northern-cyprus/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
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Turkey’s continental shelf. 101
Turkey’s tough stand escalates. In September 2011, the historically troubled relationship between Turkey and RoC became even
more complicated with the exploration for hydrocarbons in the region. The RoC, in partnership with the U.S. Houston-based company
Noble Energy, started exploratory offshore drilling in research Block
#12, code-named “Aphrodite,” a gas field partially overlapping Israel’s EEZ. 102 It subsequently discovered, in the southern half of the
island, gas in Block #12. 103 The estimated discovery, between 142
and 227bcm of gas, unleashed more political tension in Cyprus. 104 In
February 2012, the RoC announced a second licensing round. 105
Turkey immediately contested the exploration of natural gas deposits
because of maritime boundaries and Block #12’s overlap with its
continental shelf. Also, TRNC has given Turks a license to explore
in the same area. 106
As a result of the RoC’s intent to carry on with unilateral exploration for hydrocarbons, Turkey started back in September 2011 to
collaborate with the Turkish Cypriots in restoring the political balance, as they saw it. By taking reciprocal steps of equal significance,
they signed an agreement demarcating the continental shelf between
the island’s northern coast and Turkey in 2011. 107 As part of this –
mainly politically motivated – policy, in November 2011 the TRNC
Ministry of Economy and Energy and Turkish National Oil Company
(Turkish Petroleum Corporation also referred to as TPAO) signed a
Petroleum Services and Production Sharing Contract. 108 The contract
101 Duygu Guvenc, Ankara Uneasy with US Ambassador’s Statements, HURRIYET DAILY
NEWS, (Mar. 8, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ankara-uneasy-withus-ambassadors-statements.aspx?pageID=438&n=ankara-uneasy-with-us-ambassadorsstatements-2007-03-08.
102 Europe Report N°216, Aphrodite’s Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue?,
INT’L CRISIS GROUP 12 (April 2, 2012), https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-centralasia/western-europemediterranean/cyprus/aphrodite-s-gift-can-cypriot-gas-power-newdialogue last visited May 13, 2017.
103
104
105
106
107
108

Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 14.
Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 14.
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authorized TPAO to conduct exploration for oil and gas, as well as
drill and operate wells in the relevant areas. At the same time, the
TRNC granted to the TPAO hydrocarbon exploration licenses for
maritime zones in the region including in the south of the island partly overlapping Greek Cypriot exploration blocks. 109
TRNC claims equal, inherent rights on offshore reserves and
believes that EEZ delimitation is directly linked to the sovereignty issue, which is part of the ongoing comprehensive settlement negotiations, and should be left to the discretion of the new partnership government. 110 In response to unilateral pursuit by the RoC, the TRNC
granted oil concessions to TPAO to conduct groundbreaking research
and hydrocarbon exploration activities in seven EEZ areas that overlap with those demarcated by the RoC government. TRNC relies on
Turkey’s military and diplomatic support to assert its rights and jurisdiction over the maritime areas of Cyprus. 111 Turkey holds a longstanding position according to which islands facing longer coastal
fronts should have diminished rights regarding generating maritime
zones. Turkey argues that Turkey’s related coasts, which face the
mentioned delimitation area, extend from Gazipaşa/ Antalya to
Deveboynu Cape of Muğla. 112 As indicated in the ICJ Decision in
the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf Dispute of the St. Pierre
and Miquelon Islands between France and Canada, for the nonencroachment of Turkey’s relevant coasts, whose frontal length is
relatively 10 times longer, the median line to be drawn between the
related coasts of Turkey and RoC should head towards the east in a
way to let Turkish coasts open into far distances. 113 Besides, the
transportation to the Suez Canal, the most important waterway in the
region, and Antalya and Mersin ports, which are among the most
important ports in the region, should not be blocked, as indicated in
the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau decision. 114
Turkey concluded a
continental shelf delimitation agreement with the TRNC and

109

Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 14.
Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 17.
111 Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 20.
112 See infra Firgure 7.
113 See generally Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985
I.C.J. 13 (June 1985), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf.
114 International Legal Materials, Guinea/Guinea-Bissau: Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary, at § 104, 25 I.L.M. 251, 295 (Mar. 1986); see also MALCOLM
D. EVANS, RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES AND MARITIME DELIMITATION, CLARENDON PRESS 179
(1989).
110
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conducted seismic surveys in the western sector of the RoC’s EEZ. 115
Against this backdrop, tensions began to escalate again on
September 26, 2014, when the RoC extended licensing rights to a
joint-venture between the Italian multinational energy company ENI
and the South Korean state-owned gas company KOGAS to begin exploratory drilling. 116 A week later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the TRNC issued a statement declaring the RoC’s extension of licensing rights to ENI-KOGAS’s to drilling in the RoC’s block #9 - the socalled Onasagoras field due south of the southern coastal city of
Larnaca on the island - ‘illegal.’ 117 The TRNC considers such actions
as an unlawful infringement of its sovereign right and seizure of sovereign wealth. It claims to possess these resources jointly with the
RoC based on the 1960 Cyprus Accords and Constitution, which
foresaw Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots as equal constituent
communities of the 1960 Republic. 118
In reaction, Turkey and NAVTEX (Navigational Telex) on
October 3, 2014 issued a warning to mariners that Turkey would be
conducting a seismic survey period from October 20 through December 30. 119 It dispatched the research ship ‘Barbaros Hayrettin Pasa’
(hereafter referred to as Barbaros) and its escorting vessels ‘M/V
Deep Supporter’ and ‘M/V Bravo Supporter’ into areas off the coast
of the RoC. 120 They were escorted by Turkish Navy guided-missile
frigate TCG Gelibolu. Based on the 2011 exploration license agreement TRNC had granted to TPAO the ships entered the TRNC’s
Block G that overlaps with the ROC’s Block #9, bordering the ENIKOGAS exploration site to survey the sea floor for hydrocarbons to
protect Turkish Cypriot rights while monitoring ENI’s drilling vessel
in Block #9. 121 At approximately the same time, Russia, Israel, and
RoC conducted a joint naval exercise in the waters of the Eastern
115

Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 14-15.
Micha’el Tanchum, Turkey Temporarily Stands Down in Eastern Mediterranean
Amidst Region-Wide Backlash, 8 (2) TURKEY ANALYST (Jan. 28, 2015),
https://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/370-turkeytemporarily-stands-down-in-eastern-mediterranean-amidst-region-wide-backlash.html.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Tanchum, supra note 116.
116
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Mediterranean when the Barbaros entered the contested EEZ between
the two countries to discover natural resources but also encroaching
on Cyprus’s EEZ.
The affair triggered a flurry of diplomatic reactions with Israel and RoC calling on Turkey to withdraw and respect the maritime
boundaries of Cyprus. The incident caused international condemnation by the EU and the U.S. 122 The RoC president, Nicos
Anastasiades, suspended further talks with the Turkish Cypriot
leader, Dervis Eroglu, aimed at ending the division of the island, until
Turkish offshore activities, which he deemed unlawful and threatening, ceased. He asked UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon to
persuade Turkey not to violate Cyprus’s EEZ. 123 Turkey became
more isolated by the end of 2014. .
In the international arena, the former European Commission
urged Turkey to avoid any threats or actions directed against a member state. The Turkish government heeded no such advice and deployed the ‘Barbaros’ in the RoC’s EEZ zone, asserting its resolve to
protect the interests of TRNC. However, Turkey faced even greater
challenges with the emergence of a regional bloc aligned against Ankara consisting of Egypt, Israel, the RoC, and Greece along with its
current situation of having no ambassadors to Egypt, Israel, RoC,
Libya and Yemen. Two separate trilateral summit meetings held
among Egypt, RoC, and Greece in November 2014 were of primary
concern. The one summit dealt with strengthening Egypt’s economic
and security ties with the two EU members, Greece and RoC. The
second summit included Egyptian expression of interest in expediting
the export of natural gas from the RoC to Egypt and condemning
Turkey’s seismic explorations off the coast of southern Cyprus. 124
The emerging opportunities for trilateral energy cooperation among
Israel, Greece, and RoC have made a strategic pivot toward Israel
potentially isolating Turkey in participating in any deal about
securing and transporting the natural resources under the sea.
Through preliminary energy agreements with Israel and RoC, Egypt
has also joined this game, especially with the recent discovery of hy-

122

Id.
Michael Leigh, Why is Turkey Increasing Tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean?,
GERMAN MARSHALL FUND (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2014/10/10/whyturkey-increasing-tensions-eastern-mediterranean.
124 Tanchum, supra note 116
123
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drocarbons in Egypt. 125
Thus, two distinct but overlapping partnerships have emerged:
Israel-RoC-Greece and in a parallel process Egypt and two Hellenic
states, RoC and Greece. As this suggests, RoC, Israel, and Egypt are
key states primarily because of the pivotal role they play as rising energy producers. All of this demonstrates a closer cooperation within
the Mediterranean framework and on January 27, 2016, Israeli Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Greek premier Alexis Tsipras, and
Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades respectively agreed to deepen
energy and security interests through the exploitation of natural gas
deposits off Israel and Cyprus. 126 Meanwhile, Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan while still refusing to recognize the
legitimacy of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi since the June 2013
Egyptian coup d’état against the elected civilian rule of President
Mohamed Morsi and ban of the Muslim Brotherhood, 127 allowed an
economic delegation in early 2017 to visit Egypt following the
normalization of relations between Israel and Turkey in June 2016.
The events stir questions about Turkey jump-starting trade and
investment activity between Cairo and Ankara and President Erdogan
altering his icy relations toward Egypt, which could help Turkey to
break out from increasing isolation among its neighbors. 128
The cooperation among the countries of the Mediterranean
has symbolic and economic value in ambitiously strengthening the
relations between the Eastern Mediterranean and the EU. While it
will take until 2019 or 2020 before the Leviathan and Aphrodite
125

Gabriel Mitchell & Zenonas Tziarras, Full of Gas, Full of Problems: The Eastern
Mediterranean’s Hydrocarbon Showdown, NAT’L INTEREST (Jan. 6, 2015),
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/full-gas-full-problems-the-eastern-mediterraneans-11974.
126 Luke Baker, Israel Hopes for E.U. Leverage with East Mediterranean Push, REUTERS
(Feb. 1, 2016, 9:43 AM), http://uk.rE.U.ters.com/article/uk-israel-mediterranean-tiesidUKKCN0VA2PP?feedType=RSS&feedName.E.U.E.U.
127 Bryony Jones and Susannah Cullinane, “What is the Muslim Brotherhood?,” CNN
(July 3, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/africa/egypt-muslim-brotherhoodexplainer/index.html. Egyptian street protesters alleged "Brotherhoodization" of the
government -- the imposition of the Islamist views propagated by the Muslim Brotherhood,
of which President Morsi is a member, leading to the overthrow of the government.
128 Khalid Hassan, “Can economic opportunity bring Turkey, Egypt closer?, AL MONITOR,
(Feb. 17, 2017)
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/02/egypt-turkey-economic-interestsimproved-relations-visits.html.
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fields start exporting gas, nonetheless, regional dynamics in regard to
the economic and security prospects to transport gas by pipeline, possibly even via Turkey, or in liquefied form by ship to Europe have far
reaching impacts. The EU will have an alternative to its current
dependency on gas imports from Russia, especially in light of worsening relations with Russia due to the Ukraine crisis. Furthermore,
the prospect of strengthening EU energy security implies prosperity
and security for both regions. 129
Other significant developments that fall within the same maritime geopolitical context include the long-standing Turkey-Greece
(NATO members since 1952) dispute over the shared rights in the
Aegean maritime zones. Turkey considers portions of the disputed
Aegean Sea gray areas and maintains that any unilateral effort from
Greece to expand its maritime zones constitutes a casus belli (cause
for war). 130 Despite various efforts between Greece and Turkey to
normalize ties, discussions remain focused on the economy, tourism,
and energy to avoid the fundamental, but infinitely more sensitive issues with the potential of events evolving to the brink of war.
While the bilateral dispute between the Cypriot communities
is lessening, the region remains engulfed by the Cyprus conflict’s
spillover. Inability to resolve the problem of sharing the hydrocarbon
resources may turn the dispute into one of the sea with all adjacent
coastal states not recognizing the established maritime boundaries in
the region. Thus, cooperation among all the littoral states — Turkey,
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Egypt, Greece, Palestine, TRNC, and RoC —
is needed but currently unlikely. Territorial claims of an EEZ pose
increasing tensions and possible armed conflicts between interested
parties in the region. RoC argues that Turkey’s deployment of the
“Barbaros” to Block #9 in the fall of 2014 was a serious violation of
its sovereignty. 131 While the RoC authorities cannot prevent the
“Barbaros” from traversing its waters within the EEZ according to
UNCLOS, 132 the conduct of research operations undertaken in its
EEZ by the Turkish Government is considered a breach of international law by the RoC. According to UNCLOS, “States shall have
due regard to the rights and duties . . . and shall comply with the laws
129

Id.
Augusto Sinagra, The Problem of Delimitting the Territorial Waters Between Greece
and Turkey in the Aegean Sea, in THE AGEAN SEA 2000, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM İN THE AEGEAN SEA 170, 171 (Bayram Öztürk ed., 2000).
131 Tanchum, supra note 116.
132 See UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 58.
130
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and regulations” 133 of the coastal state in the EEZ. However, the
Convention does not refer to the measures a littoral state is entitled to
take in case its sovereign rights regarding the continental shelf and
the EEZ are violated. Nonetheless, the International Law Commission back in 1956 considered the exercise of enforcement measures
by the coastal state with the view of protecting its natural resources to
fall within the scope of defending its “sovereign rights.” 134 Consequently, the RoC believed such unauthorized actions constituted
criminal offenses and justified arresting the members of the crew and
the company owning “Barbaros.” However, caution was warranted
as an armed conflict could ensue.
Turkey’s policy of sending the “Barbaros” was not baseless.
In its view, RoC’s EEZ zone remained unrecognized because the
Greek-Cypriots of the RoC misused their power in acting as the sole
legal representative of Cyprus, ignoring the entity in the north. “Barbaros” was sent to protect the rights and interests in the area, which is
a constituent element of the TRNC. According to UNCLOS Art. 300
related to “Good Faith” and “Abuse of Rights”: “States Parties shall
fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention
and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction, and freedoms recognized in
this Convention in a manner that would not constitute an abuse of
right.” 135
The tense affairs in the eastern Mediterranean region are representative of new developments that have caused a shift in traditional patterns of enmity and amity among the Eastern Mediterranean’s
primary actors: Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. Former
President Obama’s global energy security policy as part of America’s
national security was to fight the use of energy as an instrument to
undermine the security of nations. Former U.S. Vice President President Joe Biden, in his November 22, 2014 address to the Atlantic
Council summit in Istanbul, said, “For the [Eastern Mediterranean]
region, it holds the promise of enhancing stability and prosperity by
bringing together Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and hopefully one day Lebanon. It also has the potential to bring new supplies to
133

UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 58(3).
Rep. To the General Assembly, at 297, reprinted in ARTİCLES CONCERNİNG THE LAW
OF THE SEAS WİTH COMMENTARİES (United Nations 1956).
135 UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 300.
134
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Europe, to increase its energy security by diversifying energy resources.” 136 In other words, the U.S. envisions a liberal world order
in which prosperity and stability are symbiotic in achieving security.
The energy resources under the sea in the Eastern Mediterranean region harbor wealth that in turn can bring peace to the area. However,
U.S. foreign policy fails to refer to the ultimate security necessary to
attain peace, which is the socially, historically and religiously embedded individual physical being. This requires a deepening of the
values within which ideas and beliefs are deconstructed and problematized. 137 U.S. foreign policy must replace current static concepts of
security with a much more proactive comprehensive and wellcoordinated security strategy through fine-tuned diplomacy drawing
on broader human security issues like refugees, human trafficking on
the high seas, environmental degradation, climate change, water
shortage, disease, poverty, democracy, and terrorism as part of a securitized public policy. The individual is the “irreducible base unit”
for explorations of security with the state remaining the central actor
in international politics and principal agent for addressing security issues. 138 In a broad approach to human security and resolution of maritime disputes by international law, allies together with other powers
could achieve peace, stability, and prosperity in the regions. The
U.S. could complement the ambitions of regional pivotal or major
powers by becoming a signatory to UNCLOS to support international
maritime law arbitration as a gateway to addressing human and global energy security. The U.S. could advocate a “Joint Maritime Development Regime,” modelled on the Arctic Council where the organization would arbitrate maritime boundary disputes by sorting out
the international law implications of the EEZ claims.
IX.

U.S., CHINA, TURKEY, AND RUSSIA’S SHIFT IN EASTERN
MEDITERRANEAN GEOPOLITICS – RISING TENSIONS
For over two decades, the United States has placed the issues

136 Vice President Joe Biden, Remarks on European Energy to the Atlantic Council
Energy and Economic Summit (Nov. 22, 2014) (transcript available on The White House
website
located
at
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/11/22/remarks-vice-president-joe-biden-european-energy-security-atlanticcouncil (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
137 Booth, Beyond Critical Security Studies, in CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND WORLD
POLITICS, supra note 1, at 268.
138 Steve Smith, The Contested Concept of Security, in CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES AND
WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1, at 32.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017

39

Touro Law Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 [2017], Art. 10

866

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33

of maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean and China Seas on
the backburner. As the Chinese economy contracts and potential
domestic social unrest rises, the Chinese government has chosen a
strategy to transition from a nation only interested in economic development to a country committed to defending Chinese global interests. China’s commitment suggests a national tenacity to the extent
of being prepared to use force, if need be, most notably in the China
Seas. The prosperity and security of East Asian states are increasingly affected by this geopolitical shift involving disputes between China and its neighbors over islands’ sovereignty and jurisdiction of
maritime zones. China has decided to step forcefully onto the world
stage while the U.S. is pursuing a strategy of rebalancing its military
assets from the Middle East to the Asian-Pacific due to considerable
economic and political challenges.
While Chinese warships have begun proclaiming control over
disputed waters and islands, there have been naval skirmishes between China the Philippines and Japan. “China is using land reclamation to turn” rocky shoals into little fortresses some even having
airfields. 139 It appears China intends to claim the entire South China
Sea for itself. The U.S. reaction is full of threatening remarks pledging to defend the interests of open seas in international waters while
many Chinese believe they must demonstrate their steadfastness and
not back down through intimation. In short, the cycle of tension is
rising, risking regional and global peace and prosperity.
Many neighboring countries, such as Japan, Philippines,
South Korea, and Taiwan, are objecting strongly. 140 The Republic of
the Philippines filed a complaint against the People’s Republic of
China under the UNCLOS with the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA) 141 and on November 29, 2015, the PCA ruled in the Philip139

China is Flexing its Rapidly Modernizing Military Muscle. This was Going to Happen
Eventually, NAT’L POST (May 28, 2015, 6:18 PM), http://news.nationalpost.com/fullcomment/china-is-flexing-its-rapidly-modernizing-military-muscle-this-was-going-tohappen-eventually.
140 Id.
141 The PCA is a permanent bureaucracy that assists temporary tribunals to resolve
disputes among states (and similar entities), intergovernmental organizations, or even private
parties arising out of international agreements. The cases span a range of legal issues
involving territorial and maritime boundaries, sovereignty, human rights, international
investment, and international and regional trade. The Republic of the Philippines v. The
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pines’ favor on the question of jurisdiction. With the jurisdictional
issue resolved, the court evaluated the merit of four legal assertions
made by the Philippines.
a. Status of Beijing’s “nine-dash line” (9DL) claim in the
South China Sea. Manila argued that the 9DL is an excessive maritime claim and not in line with the entitlements for coastal states under UNCLOS.
b. The Philippines argued that China’s occupation of various
features of the Spratly Islands are illegal and claims to title or sovereignty over completely submerged areas, or historical rights to living
and non-living natural resources, including control of maritime navigation, are illegitimate.
c. The Court should evaluate the Philippines’ argument that
China is illegally exploiting natural resources within areas that would
fall under the Philippines’ EEZ under UNCLOS.
d. Manila claimed that China has interfered with its ability to
navigate freely its own EEZ. 142
On July 12, 2016, the tribunal at the Hague-based PCA issued
a unanimous award to the Philippines in the case of The Republic of
People’s Republic of China, PCA Nº 2013-19, at 1 ¶1 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Oct. 29, 2015),
http://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1506.
142 Ankit Panda, Philippines v. China: Court Rules Favorably on Jurisdiction, Case Will
Proceed, THE DIPLOMAT (Oct. 30, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/philippines-vchina-court-rules-favorably-on-jurisdiction-case-will-proceed/.
The fact is, according to the Treaty of Paris in 1898, the Treaty of Washington in 1900 and the Convention Between the United States and Great
Britain of 1930 which defined the territory of the Philippines, the western boundary of the Philippines is delimited by 118 degrees east longitude. The Huangyan Island [Scarborough] and Nansha Islands [Spratly]
are completely to the west of 118 degrees east longitude. They are not
the Philippines’ territory. After the Philippines gained independence, the
domestic law of the Philippines, and the relevant treaties concluded by
the Philippines all accepted the legal force of the three treaties mentioned above, and confirmed the scope of its territory to be limited by
118 degrees east longitude. Nevertheless, after the 1970s, the Philippines [dictator Marcos] staged four military operations and illegally invaded and occupied eight islands and reefs of China’s Nansha Islands.
This is what is at the bottom of the territorial dispute between China and
the Philippines.
Wang Yi on the South China Sea issue at the ASEAN Regional Forum, CHINADAILY,
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-08/07/content_21532990.htm (last updated Aug. 7,
2015, 22:52).
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Philippines vs. The People’s Republic of China 143 concerning maritime entitlements and the status of features in the South China Sea,
among other issues.
As to Point a) regarding the “Nine-Dash-Line . . . the Tribunal
concluded, ‘that, to the extent China had historic rights to resources
in the waters of the South China Sea, such rights were extinguished
to the extent they were incompatible with the exclusive economic
zones provided for in the Convention . . . [and] there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas
falling within the ‘nine-dash line.’” 144
As to Point b) the Tribunal concluded “that none of the Spratly Islands is capable of generating extended maritime zones. The
Tribunal also held that the Spratly Islands cannot generate maritime
zones collectively as a unit. Having found that none of the features
claimed by China was capable of generating an exclusive economic
zone, the Tribunal found that it could—without delimiting a boundary—declare that certain sea areas are within the exclusive economic
zone of the Philippines because those areas are not overlapped by any
possible entitlement of China.” 145
As to Point c) Harm to Marine Environment, the Tribunal
found “[t]hat China had caused severe harm to the coral reef environment and violated its obligation to preserve and protect fragile
ecosystems and the habitat of depleted, threatened, or endangered
species . . . (using methods that inflict severe damage on the coral
reef environment) and had not fulfilled their obligations to stop such
activities.” 146
Finally, as to Point d), “the Tribunal found that China had
violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its exclusive economic
143

Ankit Panda, International Court Issues Unanimous Award in Philippines v. China
DIPLOMAT
(July
12,
2016),
Case
on
South
China
Sea,
THE
http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/international-court-issues-unanimous-award-in-philippinesv-china-case-on-south-china-sea; see PCA Case No 2013-19: In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, PCACASES.COM, http//: www.pcacases.com/pcadocs/PH-CN-20160712Award.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2016).
144 Matikas Santos, Key Points of Arbitral Tribunal’s Verdict on PH-China Dispute,
GLOBALNATİON (July 12, 2016, 5:34 PM), http://globalnation.inquirer.net/140947/keypoints-arbitral-tribunal-decision-verdict-award-philippines-china-maritime-dispute-unclosarbitration-spratly-islands-scarborough.
145 Id.
146 Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/10

42

Dogru and Reginbogin: Rethinking East Mediterranean Security

2017 RETHINKING EAST MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

869

zone by (a) interfering with Philippines’ fishing and petroleum exploration, (b) constructing artificial islands and (c) failing to prevent
Chinese fishermen from fishing in the zone,” interfered with the Philippines’ ability to navigate freely its own EZZ. 147
China’s Foreign Ministry announced even before the Tribunal
award that it neither accepts nor recognizes the legitimacy of the Tribunal’s award and will continue its activities in the South China
Sea. 148 After the Tribunal award the new government in the
Philippines, under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte, cautiously responded, to allow China to “forge a path to compromise, attempting to provide China with a face-saving ‘off ramp’ after the
highly embarrassing result of the award.” 149
The nature of future maritime and even territorial disputes in
the South China Sea has changed considerably. “China’s ambiguous
and capacious nine dash linehas been declared illegal under international law by a Tribunal convened under the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea.” 150 While features will not change anytime
soon and while artificial islands will not return to their natural, prereclamation state as submerged reefs or partially exposed rocks, the
legal understanding of these disputes will stand as an important precedent.
Unlike the geopolitical tension in the South China Sea, the
Eastern Mediterranean disputes are overshadowed by Syria’s President Assad’s request that Russia intervenes militarily on its behalf to
support governmental ground forces on the verge of defeat against
rebel groups. 151 The Russian involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean until September 2015 was more about soft power demonstrating
its presence in the region through naval manuevers. 152 Russia’s intervention provided Putin the opportunity to strengthen its influence
in the Middle East, dilute the international criticism and sanctions related to Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, and through massive
bombing raids in Syria enhance directly and indirectly massive refu147

Id.
Id.
149 Panda, supra note 142.
150 Panda, supra note 142.
151 Bill Chappell, Russia Begins Airstrikes in Syria After Assad’s Request, NPR (Sept. 30,
2015, 8:37 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/09/30/444679327/russiabegins-conducting-airstrikes-in-syria-at-assads-request.
152 Holly Yan, Syria Allies: Why Russia, Iran and China are Standing by the Regime,
CNN (Aug. 29, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/29/world/meast/syria-iranchina-russia-supporters/index.html.
148
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gee migration to Europe. This migration was designed to cause destabilization and polarization among NATO partners in the East due
to their nationalistic and oppressive handling of the humanitarian refugee crisis. 153 The Syrian Conflict became the watershed resulting in
a very efficient massive joint air and naval military build-up of 69
aircraft, weapon stockpiles, and more than a dozen warships. 154 The
Kremlin is in Syria to stay and Putin recently called on Russia’s Parliament to enact legislation to extend the deployment of the Russian
Air Force at Khmeimim Air Base outside Latakia, Syria, where its
planes have flown missions for almost a year in support of Assad’s
government. 155
Before massive migration of refugees to Europe and Russia’s
intervention in Syria, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean focused
on Turkey’s sending vessels in the fall of 2014 to accompany exploration vessels into EEZ waters off the coast of the RoC. Following
international condemnation by Europe and the U.S., there was a modus operandi of “wait and see” during 2015. 156 Turkey did not send
any vessels to the region again. Instead, the Turkish government
demonstrated restraint partially due to parliamentary elections in
Turkey in June 2015. 157 Also, Greek and Israeli elections were held
in the earlier part of the same year as well as presidential elections in
the TRNC in April 2015. Turkey waited to see how domestic and in153

Ellie Geranmayeh & Kadri Liik, The New Power Couple: Russia and Iran in the Midat
1
(Sept.
13,
2016),
dle
East,
ECFR,
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/iran_and_russia_middle_east_power_couple_7113
.
154 Gabriel Grosu, The Increasing Influence of Russia in the Middle East Region,
MEDITERANEAN AFF. (Feb. 10, 2016), http://mediterraneanaffairs.com/increasing-influencerussia-middle-east-region (“Based on satellite images, in the first stage, it was identified as
twelve bombers Su-24M and Su-25SM attack aircrafts, six Su-34 bombers, four SU-30CM
and helicopters Mi-24 and Mi-8 [were deplyed to Syria]. On November 17, 2015, the
involvement of 25 long-range bomber sandan, additional eight Su-34 bombers and four Su24CM bombers into the operations in Syria was announced. To protect the air base in Syria,
special forces from navy (from the black sea fleet) and special forces of the 7th air assault
(mountain) airborne division were dislocated. According to [reports], a minimum of seven t90 tanks, artillery and armored personnel carriers btr-80 were also present.”).
155 MacFarquhar, Russia and Turkey Vow to Repair Ties as West Watches Nervously,
supra note 82.
156 Tanchum, supra note 116.
157 Alberto Nardelli, Turkey Election Results: What You Need to Know, THE GUARDIAN
(June 8, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/jun/08/turkey-electionresults-what-you-need-to-know.
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ternational political developments unfolded in the region when Russia intervened.
Russia, China, and Turkey are pushing different foreign policy agendas rebalancing their roles internationally and regionally. The
delicate geopolitical regional crises have begun to compel the attention of slow-moving U.S. analysts and policymakers to contend with
conducting a campaign against ISIL and ambitious countries rivalling
the vital interests of the U.S. through the use of energy as a tool to
undermine the security of nations with potentially far-reaching consequences. Retrenchment until just recently was the guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy due to American political and economic
conditions. Former President Obama’s goal has been to limit U.S.
foreign policy entanglements. 158 Militarily in the Middle East, the
U.S. focused on using a combination of airstrikes with intelligence
and reconnaissance missions, increased financial and military resources to advise and assist regional proxies, including moderate Syrian rebels, which have failed, and successful Kurdish peshmerga of
Northern Iraq and Syria, referred to as YPD militia forces believed by
Turkey to be closely associated with the Turk-Kurdish terrorist organization called PKK. 159 Diplomatically, “the Obama Administration . . . endorsed a parallel effort to build a regional coalition, which
would curtail the flow of foreign fighters and money to ISIS” while
seeking a political solution. 160
Former President Obama attempted prudent steps to avoid an
extensive commitment of U.S. troops. Instead, he supported a counterterrorist campaign consisting of regional partners. Neither of these
missions requires an extensive commitment of U.S. Forces and stands
in marked contrast to the previous Bush administration’s ambitions
for regime change and nation-building efforts in Afghanistan or manpower-intensive counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq. 161 While the
U.S. government’s policy of retrenchment from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East sounds theoretically fulfilling, the reality
on the ground is more complex.
158 Lexington:
The
Obama
Doctrine,
ECONOMIST
(Dec.
1,
2012),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21567354-barack-obamas-foreign-policygoal-his-second-term-avoid-costly-entanglements.
159 Paul K. MacDonald & Joseph M. Parent, The Retrenchment War: Why the War
Against ISIS Will be Fought on the Cheap, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 24, 2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-09-24/retrenchment-war.
160 Id.
161 Id.
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Weeks after Russian military intervention, Turkey on November 24, 2015, citing previous warnings about Russian violation of
its airspace, shot down a Russian attack bomber Su-24, at the SyrianTurkish border. 162 This incident and its outcomes resulted in an economic boycott of Turkey and other geopolitical tactics of isolation by
Russia. Russia used the incident also as a pretext to reinforce its
military deployments in Syria and rapidly install the S-400, one of the
most advanced anti-aircraft defense systems in the world. S-400 allows the Russians to monitor any flight in the region within a radius
of 600 kilometers across the entire Syrian territory plus flights of the
U.S. and its allies. Besides monitoring the airspace of neighboring
states such as Lebanon, Israel and small portions of Jordan, Iraq and
Saudi Arabia, the S-400 provides aerial target defense at ranges of up
to 400 kilometers hitting tactical and strategic aircraft, ballistic and
cruise missiles from its military base in Latakia. 163 Furthermore, the
Russians targeted the “moderate Islamists,” who fight Assad’s forces
and were supported by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. 164 The U.S.
and the West had already deployed aircraft to the NATO Incirlik Airbase near Adana, Turkey to destroy the Islamic State of the Levant
(ISIL) before Russia’s military intervention in Syria. 165 The deployments of military assets by the U.S. and Russia to the region has put
both countries at odds as to which rebel groups are primary targets to
destroy. The power vacuum to jointly fight ISIL, a common adversary, led Turkey and Saudi Arabia to jointly flex their muscles and
join forces to engage in a higher-intensity war in the Syrian theater to
destroy the Assad regime and ISIL. Events of this kind bear serious
risks for the West. They provoke further Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria, sparking a NATO-Russia confrontation. Consequently, talks in Geneva pursue a political solution to halt hostilities
and provide humanitarian aid to the civilian population in the short
term. It is uncertain if and when the spiral of violence, chaos, and the
162 Turkey’s Downing of Russian Warplane – What We Know, BBC: NEWS, (Dec. 1,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581.
163 Grosu, supra note 154.
164 Ironically, Saudi Arabia differs with Qatar and Turkey about financing the Islamic
organization, Muslim Brotherhood, whose Palestinian branch is Hamas, and an enemy of
Egypt and Saudi Arabia making Qatar the exception to the Gulf Cooperation Council rule.
165 Incirlik
Air
Base,
GLOBAL
SECURITY,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/incirlik.htm (last visited May 1, 2017).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/10

46

Dogru and Reginbogin: Rethinking East Mediterranean Security

2017 RETHINKING EAST MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

873

civilizational humanitarian crisis that has extended from the Middle
East across the Eastern Mediterranean with millions of Syrians seeking asylum in Europe will end.
Russia’s and China’s involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea is demonstrated by their international presence by holding
joint naval manuvers efecting relations with Israel, Egypt, Turkey
and Saudi Arabia. 166 A powerful new alliance of two major eastern
giants is flexing its muscles in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, which
is the very backyard of Western Europe — much as China has done
on its own in the Pacific. In the context of these regional developments, the driver related to maritime security and exploitation of hydrocarbon interests for the respective regions has begun to occupy a
more prominent place in U.S. security. Closer analysis of regional
dynamics is expanding.
Israel-Turkey-Iran-Palestine-CyprusLebanon-Egyptian relations embedded in U.S., EU, and Russian relations and Philippines-Vietnam-Malaysia-Brunei-Taiwan-Japan relations, respectively, entrenched in Chinese and U.S. interests have imposed new intellectual challenges.
These developments are impacting the strategic calculus of
the U.S., Europe, and the Middle and Far East in light of the current
conflict in Ukraine which spawned the worst crisis between Russia
and the West since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s annexation of
Crimea and its military support for separatist forces in the Ukrainian
regions of Donetsk and Luhansk have caused a hotspot of tension
bordering at times on the brink of war between Russia and the
Ukraine. 167 The geopolitical shifts have challenged European and
NATO security creating an uneasy situation and altered the U.S. policy of retrenchment to implement a policy of demonstrating military
resourcefulness through joint military exercises in Eastern Europe,
deployment of F-22 fighters to eastern Europe and multilateral coordination of economic sanctions against Russia, economic diversity to
fight countries using energy as a weapon to undermine a nation’s security with a strong emphasis on respect for the sovereign integrity of
Ukraine and international law. The challenges in the Far East require
a deployment of U.S. naval forces to the China Seas. All these
166 Carol J. Williams, First Russia-China Naval War Games Underway in Mediterranean,
L.A. TIMES (May 11, 2015 7:13 PM), http://www.latimes.com/world/E.U.rope/la-fg-chinarussia-joint-naval-manE.U.vers-20150511-story.html.
167 Rob Ferguson, Ukraine: Imperialism, War and the Left, 144 INT’L SOCIALISM (Oct. 10,
2014), http://isj.org.uk/ukraine-imperialism-war-and-the-left/.
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measures demonstrate different types of power to coerce Russia to rethink its policies towards Ukraine and China to reconsider its policies
towards its neighbors in the China Seas region. Nothing has
changed. Hence, a rethinking of new approaches to security and international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean and China Seas
may bear more fruits.
As Russia uses international law to argue that the Assad government in Syria is the only legitimate government, turning all antiAssad fighters into terrorists from ISIL or al Qaeda-related, U.S.- or
Turkish-backed “moderates” are conceding the lead to Russia and its
strategic aims. Without a clear goal or fixed positions beyond a ‘political process,’ to resolve the Syrian civil war, there is barely a
glimmer of hope to end the humanitarian crisis in Syria and return
peace and stability to the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East regions. The U.S. needs to reverse its apparent restraint and do what
historically Great Powers do best – fight for their national interest as
they define them.
After the war with Georgia, Russia’s Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev used the terms “near abroad” and “privileged interests.”168
He considers bordering countries within a “sphere of interest” making Ukraine’s Crimea and Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia examples of aggravated concern about Russia’s strategic intentions and
long-term policy towards its neighbors. 169 The same terms were used
in the secret protocols of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement of August 23, 1939, and supplemented on September 19, 1939, after the
joint invasion of Poland in which Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler
agreed to divide up Poland and other sovereign countries in Eastern
Europe. 170 The U.S. must counter the ambitions of territorial expansion by regional and major power by using soft and hard power tactics to differentiate and deter powers to overstep international law.
In the aftermath of the Cold War the U.S. and Turkey under168 Dmitri Trenin, Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence, 32 (4) WASH. Q. 3, 3, 8
(OCT. 2009); see generally WALTHER HOFER, DIE ENTFESSELUNG DES ZWEITEN
WELTKRİEGES: EINES STUDIE UEBER DER INTERNATIONALEN BEZİEHUNGEN IM SOMMER 1939
MIT DOKUMENTEN (S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 1964).
169 Trenin, supra note 168, at 3-4, 7, 13.
170 World
War II: The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, JEWİSH VİRTUAL LİBR.,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-molotov-ribbentrop-pact-august-1939 (last visited
May 1, 2017).
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went profound transformations. The U.S. rose as a superpower in a
unipolar world whose policies 25 years later are aimed to consolidate
its military because it overextended its economic capabilities by excessive military spending without comparison to any of its rivals, endorsing programs to expand NATO and dispatching forces around the
world on humanitarian missions. 171 After 9/11, Washington enlarged
these operations to include counterterrorism operations, missile defense programs and construction of more military bases around the
world. 172
Turkey also began to demonstrate signs of a foreign policy
from deviating from that of the U.S. under Turkish President Ozal in
the late 1990s. 173 In 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
was elected to power with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (prime minister
2003-2014 and president since 2014), Abdullah Gul (prime minister
2002-2003, president 2007-14), and Ahmet Davutoglu (chief advisor
to Prime Minister Erdogan 2003-2009, Minister for Foreign Affairs
2009-2014, and prime minister 2014 - 2016) succeeded by Binali
Yıldırım. 174
Davutoglu was the architect of the new Turkish foreign policy
concept and author of a book called Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic
Depth). 175 Davutoglu advocated a foreign policy doctrine underscoring geographical and historical depth. Turkey, as a result of its historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, possesses great geographical
depth putting Turkey in the heartland of many geopolitical areas of
influence calling for expanded engagement with all its neighbors.
171 Eirik B. Lundestad & Tor G. Jakobsen, A Unipolar World: System and Wars in Three
SOCİAL
SCİENCE
(Feb.
5,
2013),
Different
Military
Eras,
POPULAR
http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2013/02/05/a-unipolar-world-systems-and-wars-inthree-different-military-eras/ (last visited May 14, 2017).
172 James Sterngold, After 9/11, U.S. Policy Built World Bases, SFGATE (Mar. 21, 2004
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/After-9-11-U-S-policy-built-on-world-bases2777808.php.
173 F. STEPHEN LARRABEE & IAN O. LESSER, TURKİSH FOREIGN POLICY IN AN AGE OF
UNCERTAINTY 3 (2003), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1612.html.
174 Justice and Development Party: Political Party, Turkey, ENCYCLOPEDİA BRİTANNİCA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Justice-and-Development-Party-political-party-Turkey
(last visited May 14, 2017).
175 Turkish foreign policy under the AKP administration has been associated with the
name of Ahmet Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu was the chief foreign policy advisor to Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan before he was appointed foreign minister in 2009. Bezen
Balamir Coskun, The Post-Davutoglu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy, E-INTERNATİONAL
REL. (June 3, 2016), http://www.e-ir.info/2016/06/03/the-post-davutoglu-era-in-turkishforeign-policy/. As an academic, he has outlined his foreign policy doctrine in several
writings, most important of which is his book “Strategic Depth.” Id.
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Davutoglu calls for a reassessment of the role of the U.S. hegemony
in global affairs and foresees Turkey as a regional power. When the
Turkish Grand National Assembly in 2003 refused to ratify a bill
backed by the AKP government under Turkish Prime Minister Abdullah Gul to allow more than 60,000 U.S. troops to operate from
Turkish bases and ports in the event of war with Iraq, a position supported by many other American allies such as France and Germany.
Gul argued that Iraq posed no imminent threat to the U.S. according
to Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, and many considered this a turning
point in relations between the U.S. and Turkey. 176 While Turkey and
the U.S. continued to maintain a strategic relationship following the
invasion of Iraq, anti-American sentiment grew over time, and the
seeds of then Turkish President Ozal’s Middle Eastern foreign policy
shifted to an outspoken independent foreign policy with the beginning of the Arab Awakening in 2011. 177 At approximately the same
time, an ambitious project unfolded to construct a warship without
technological and financial support from a third country that was
backed by Turkey’s new ruling AKP. In 2004, Turkey began implementation of its $3 billion “National Warship” program, known by its
Turkish abbreviation MİLGEM (national ship). 178 Seven years later,
in September 2011, on the occasion of the commissioning of
MİLGEM’s first surface combatant, TCG Heybeliada, then Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared Turkey’s national interests
as “residing in the Suez Canal, the adjacent seas, and from there extending to the Indian Ocean.” 179 Turkey’s vision of becoming a regional power unveiled itself with the Arab Awakening by adopting
multilateral policies often causing friction with the U.S. and its allies,
which ultimately failed in a zero-sum foreign policy and isolated
Turkey among its neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean region today.
Under the AKP, millions of Turks had achieved a middleclass lifestyle. Between 2003 and 2013 the AKP overhauled Turkey’s social services (education, pensions, health care), opened its
domestic market to privatization while controlling a hyperinflationary
176
177
178
179

Tanchum, supra note 116.
Tanchum, supra note 116.
Tanchum, supra note 116.
Tanchum, supra note 116.
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currency, and improved the country’s infrastructure. 180 Foreign direct investments jumped eightfold from $15 billion in 1923–2002 to
$123 billion in ten years. 181 Turkey’s leadership provided the country with economic growth near 10% in the early 2010s, avoiding the
global financial meltdown. 182 Turkey joined the ranks of the G20,
and by spring 2013 all its debt to the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) was paid off. 183
In 2012, ten years after 9/11, a newly re-elected President
Barack Obama initiated a different foreign policy in light of whether
it furthers, protects, or risks key components of his domestic agenda.
Moreover, the Obama administration was complacent in challenging
Russia’s military build-up and criticizing Putin’s internal repression.
He failed to advocate a robust and viable NATO to deter Russia’s expansionism as Putin demonstrated in 2008 against Georgia believing
that he could circumvent Putin by working with Prime Minister
Medvedev.
It was not until Vladimir Putin’s announcement that he would
run for a third term as president and Russia’s subsequent seizure of
Crimea, followed by the invasion of eastern Ukraine that the Obama
administration reassessed its policy towards Russia by implementing
economic sanctions together with European partners and deploying
military assets to eastern Europe as part of NATO’s deterrence. The
objective was to dissuade Russia from a new wave of Russian military exercises targeting the Baltic region and preparations for a phony
Russian-minority uprising in one of the Baltic states or a struggle
over the rail corridor through Lithuania connecting Kaliningrad and

Jules Gray, Turkey Aiming for Huge New Infrastructure Developments, WORLD FİN.
(Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.worldfinance.com/infrastructure-investment/governmentpolicy/turkey-aiming-for-huge-new-infrastructure-developments.
181 Turkey’s
Secrets
To
Success,
BLOOMBERG
MEDIA,
https://www.bloombergmedia.com/assets/pdfs/custom-publishing/150504_Turkey.pdf (last
visited May. 2, 2017).
182 The
Turkish Economy 2013, ISTANBUL SANAYİ ODASI (May 2013),
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&cad=rja&uact=8
&ved=0ahUKEwjcktGNgZ_SAhVCYyYKHdtpA1MQFggoMAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fw
ww.iso.org.tr%2Ffile%2Fturkish_economy41.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGsUfRpvk1MjHw4an6LHD4cVOdwrQ&sig2=5RKJQUUM91DQlaAzUEYxQ.
183 Yeni Şafak, Turkey Among 11 Countrıes Cleared of IMF Debt, REPUBLİC TURK.
OFFICE PRIME MINISTER DIRECTORATE GEN. PRESS AND INFO., (May 5, 2016),
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/english/agenda/turkey-among-11-countries-cleared-of-imfdebt1/95003.
180
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the rest of Russia. 184 As the Economist observed in December 2012,
“Mr. Obama and his team believe that his outstanding task is to secure a domestic legacy. Their fear is that foreign entanglements may
threaten that goal.” 185 In itself retrenchment is a viable policy until
potential threats in certain regions require greater assets to project
power and deter others turning into protagonists as evidenced by the
increasing presence of Chinese and Russian naval activities in the
Eastern Mediterranean Sea.
With increased successful explorations for oil and hydrocarbons, many countries see an increased need for their military to secure their offshore energy interests and patrol their EEZs by procuring larger and more powerful surface vessels and maritime patrol
aircraft to accomplish these goals. Until now the naval fleets in the
Eastern Mediterranean are still quite small. Will the geopolitical dynamics of the major global powers in the eastern Mediterranean spiral
into larger regional, national defense expenditures and growing
mounting tensions among the countries in the region? Will the unimaginable become inevitable as a geopolitical crisis intensifies? Can
diplomatic solutions be found through international maritime delimitation agreements as laid down in UNCLOS and the Geneva Convention of 1958?
Since the Arab Spring Awakening in 2011, revolutions ushered in hope for a ‘Renaissance’ and despair through “Counterrevolutions.” 186 Coup d’états in Egypt, the rise of terrorist led civil wars in
Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, Iran’s facilitating terrorist activities
through its aides in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon together with the
Russian and American military intervention depict the chaotic regional instability. Russia’s deployment of naval assets, weaponry,
and air force to the region fills a power vacuum of uncertainty caused
by former President Obama’s policy of rebalancing the strategic shift

184 Anne Applebaum, Obama and Europe: Missed Signals, Renewed Commitments,
FOREIGN AFF. (Sept.–Oct. 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/europe/obama-andeurope.
185 Lexington: The Obama Doctrine, supra note 158.
186 Craig Chamberlain, Five Years After the Arab Spring: Despair, but Also Hope, ILL.
NEWS BUREAU (Jan. 21, 2016, 11:15 AM), https://news.illinois.edu/blog/view/6367/314234.
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of gravity to the Asia-Pacific theatre of operations. 187 In recent
weeks and months, the U.S. has been recalibrating its military intervention by collaborating more closely with Turkey and other rebel
groups like the YPG in its military operations to fight ISIL in Syria. 188 President Donald Trump on May 9, 2017 announced his decision to approve a plan to arm the YPG causing a tumultuous outburst
of criticism by the Republic of Turkey which fears that these arms
will eventually fall into the PKK’s hands to be used against Turks.
How real this fear really is can be better understood in the context of
a Washington Post article of January 7, 2017 titled: U.S. military aid
is fuelling big ambitions for Syria’s leftist Kurdish militia. The report
says, “the method in which recruits for the PYD are prepped by
Kurdish instructors before receiving military training from American
troops [is] to learn and embrace the ideology of Abdullah Ocalan,
[the PKK] leader imprisoned in Turkey whose group is branded a terrorist organization by both Washington and Ankara.” 189 Amazingly,
“U.S. officials and military advisers in Syria declined to discuss details of the training being provided to the Arabs in the force,” 190 admonishing any knowledge of ideological lessons they receive before
their military training. While the U.S. Government doesn’t comment,
“the scene in the classroom captures some of the complexity of the
U.S.-backed fight against the Islamic State in Syria, where a Kurdish
movement that subscribes to an ideology at odds with stated U.S. policy has become America’s closest ally against the extremists.”191
When the U.S. gave the Taliban in Afghanistan weapons to fight the
Soviet Union in the 1980s, the same group of fighters became the
arch enemy of the U.S. a decade later. How a balanced cooperation
can be reached in utilizing Turkey’s armed forces and fire power
while combining the fighting spirit of the YPG to destroy ISIL con187

Thomas R. Fedyszyn, The Russian Navy ‘Rebalances’ to the Mediterranean,
139/12/1,330 PROC. MAG (Dec. 2013), http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/201312/russian-navy-rebalances-mediterranean.
188 Tim Arango, Anne Barnard, & Ceylan Yeginsu, Turkey’s Military Plunges Into Syria,
Enabling Rebels to Capture ISIS Stronghold, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/middleeast/turkey-syria-isis.html?_r=0.
189 Liz Sly, “U.S. military aid is fueling big ambitions for Syria’s leftist Kurdish militia,”
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 7, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/usmilitary-aid-is-fueling-big-ambitions-for-syrias-leftist-kurdish-militia/2017/01/07/6e457866c79f-11e6-acda-59924caa2450_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.9d3608bb9b13
(last
visited May 16, 2017).
190 Id.
191 Id.
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tinues to be a major challenge requiring further re-evaluation. As anti-American sentiment among Turkish civil society grows, reassurances that the military armament supplied to the YPG by the U.S.
will be returned or accounted for is questionable.
Before Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine and annexation of
Crimea on March 18, 2014, Russia played on the financial susceptibility of countries like Greece and Cyprus, a financial hub to launder
Russian money and a holiday destination, by offering in 2013 both
countries billions in financial help to manage the country’s debt,
which was causing social and political instability. 192 However, Russian overtures of funding eventually were curtailed not only because
of sanctions but also due to the rapid decline in oil prices starting
mid-2014 causing the Russian economy to sink into recession at the
beginning of 2015. 193 Meanwhile, the economy in Cyprus was recovering so that the 2013 financial bailout program of €10 billion to
Cyprus by the Eurogroup - (European Commission (EC), European
Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) - was
already being repaid in 2015. 194
Until Russia’s military intervention in September 2015, Russian ships used Greek-Cypriot ports as alternatives to its Tartus base
in Syria threatened by the conflict between rebels and the government
of Bashar al-Assad. 195 According to a Reuters newspaper report of
June 6, 2013, the naval task force consisted of approximately 16
ships and 3 Marine helicopters, and at times included Russia’s one
192

Ilya Arkhipov & Vladimir Kuznetsov, “Russia Readying Help for Companies With
Funds Ensnared in Cyprus,” BLOOMBERG (Mar. 27, 2013).
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-27/russia-readying-help-for-companieswith-funds-ensnared-in-cyprus; Tom Parfitt & Mehreen Khan, “Russia ready to offer Greeks
cash in return for assets,”, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 7, 2015),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11519651/Russia-ready-to-offer-Greekscash-in-return-for-assets.html.
193 Ivana Kottasova,
“Russia’s economy has been in recession for 18 months,”
CNN:MONEY (Aug. 11, 2016) http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/11/news/economy/russiaeconomy-recession-six-quarters/index.html. .
194 “Eurogroup signs off on bailout agreement reached by Cyprus and troika,”
25,
2013),
EKATHIMERINI(Mar.
http://www.ekathimerini.com/149669/article/ekathimerini/news/eurogroup-signs-off-onbailout-agreement-reached-by-cyprus-and-troika (last visited May 15, 2017).
195 Paul J Saunders, Cyprus Port Deal Gives Russian Navy Alternative to Tartus, AL
MONİTOR (Mar. 3, 2015) http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/russiasanctions-europe-nato-economy-cyprus-mediterranean.html.
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aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov. 196 Russian officials claimed
that this presence would contribute to the fight against terrorism and
piracy in the region. Russia has used its navy to evacuate Russian
citizens from Syria amid the violence there. However, the increase in
Russian naval presence together with the first joint naval war games
in European waters with China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy
(PLAN) combined exercises in the Mediterranean Sea, comes at a
time when the West’s relations with Russia are at their tensest since
the end of the Cold War. Much as the Royal Navy projected power
in the 19th century by cruising in the Far East, “the Russian and Chinese fleets’ project power in European waters” by sailing in the Mediterranean Sea. 197 The combined naval exercises with the Russians
enhance China’s ambitions to transform its country into a modern,
maritime power capable of challenging the U.S. in the Asian-Pacific
theatre and elsewhere in the world. The Chinese issued a white paper
on May 27, 2015, signalling that China intends to project its military
power beyond its immediate periphery, into the open ocean, in pursuit of ‘national rejuvenation’ aimed at countering what Chinese
leaders see as U.S.-led efforts to check China’s rise. 198 The document marks a remarkable transition from China’s hands-off approach
to global affairs to a reorientation of economic development towards
a national tenacity in defending the global scope of Chinese interests
even through the use of force. 199
The U.S. could do considerably more to counteract these actions with sophisticated, multidimensional, multilateral, and ambitious efforts of its own. It could adopt a much more comprehensive
and well-coordinated strategy aimed at resolving delimitation boundary issues by initiating a “joint development regime” based on the
following criteria.

196 Alexei Anishchuk, Russia Announces Permanent Mediterranean Naval Presence,
REUTERS (June 6, 2013 4:53 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-navymediterranean-idUSBRE95515I20130606 (last visited May 25, 2015).
197 Holmes, supra note 26; see also id.
198 Lauren Dickey & Stephen E. Liszewski, Five Takeaways from China’s Bold, New
ON
FOREIGN
REL.
(May
27,
2015),
Military
Strategy,
COUNCIL
http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2015/05/27/five-takeaways-from-chinas-bold-new-militarystrategy.
199 Id.
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CASE FOR AN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN DELIMITATION
PROGRAM

As the delimitation should be effected to reach an equitable
result, the equitable character of the delimitation needs to be examined in each and every case. Thus, the consideration of relevant circumstances becomes essential. In fact, there are a number of relevant
circumstances, which are divided into two groups, geographical and nongeographical factors. 201 Those factors will be examined relating to the
Eastern Mediterranean Sea.
Regarding the maritime delimitation in the Eastern Mediterranean some of the factors will affect the location of the maritime
boundary line such as regional geography, including economic
factors; security and navigational factors; general characteristics; and
particular features of the region (i.e., ocean, semi-enclosed sea); configurations of coasts; proportionality; presence of islands; and especially islands ‘on the wrong side.’
Previous decisions and practice will point at best to the kinds
of factors to be considered and approaches to be adopted, but will not
permit the deduction of a precise boundary line that must be established. 202
The analysis of the conceptual nature and relationships of the
continental shelf and EEZ leads to the conclusion that the EEZ
boundary will tend to follow the continental shelf boundary. For this
reason, this consideration will concentrate on circumstances relevant
to continental shelf delimitation. Except for geological and geomorphologic factors the same range of conditions would have potential
relevance for both because the width of the Eastern Mediterranean
Sea is less than 400 miles.
200

A.

Relevant Area

To achieve an equitable solution, all factors in the relevant ar200

UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 74, 83.
U.N. DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA: OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, HANDBOOK ON THE DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES, at 25-46, U.N. Sales No.
E.01.V.2 (2000) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
202 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 33, at 182.
201
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ea have to be taken considered. The sine qua non of delimitation is
the basic and often unarticulated premise that there must be an area
over which each party in dispute claims sole jurisdiction.
Both the 1958 Convention 203 and 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 204 imply the area to be delimited. The relevant area is important in a case of adjudication. Both the judgments of the ICJ and
the awards of arbitral tribunals contain at the beginning of their findings a general description of the area in which the delimitation operation is to be carried out. 205 The recourse to the relevant area is mainly
useful when dealing with the proportionality exercise.
In this context, looking at the Eastern Mediterranean, being a
part of a semi-closed sea, the coastal length of the coastal state is important. As part of “relevant circumstances,” it will affect the location of the boundary in the Eastern Mediterranean.
B. Configuration of the Coasts
In the case of maritime law, the role of the coastal geography
is dominant when applying delimitation, which is based on two core
principles: “[t]he land dominates the sea, and it dominates it by the
intermediary of the coastal front . . . .” 206 This has been underscored
in all of the relevant decisions, i.e., in the Libya-Malta case; in the
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case; and in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau
case. 207 On configuration of the coast, it may be possible to point to
three factors to be examined:

203

UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 6.
UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 83.
205 The Court in its 1985 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya – Malta case stated: “It is appropriate to
begin with a general description of the geographical context of the dispute before the Court .
. . define in geographical terms the area which is relevant to the delimitation and the area in
dispute between the Parties.” HANDBOOK, supra note 201, at 26. In the Anglo – French
Case, the Court stated: “The area of continental shelf with which the court is concerned . . .
forms part of the continental shelf of North-West Europe.” Delimitation of the Continental
Shelf Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the French
Republic,
18
R.I.A.A.
3,
¶ 2,
at
18
(Mar.
14,
1978),
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XVIII/3-413.pdf.E.U.
206 Prosper Weil, Geographic Considerations in Maritime Delimitation, in
I
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 115.
207 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 68, at
50 (June 3, 1985), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf; The Delimination of the
Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (Guinea and Guinea-Bissau), 19
R.I.A.A. 149, ¶ 124, at 194 (Feb. 14, 1985), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XIX/149196.pdf.
204
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(1) Opposite or adjacent coast;
(2) Concavity or convexity of coast; and
(3) The general direction of coastline.
In this context, when the Eastern Mediterranean Sea is considered, the general direction of the coast of the littoral Sates may be
decisive in a delimitation agreement. For example, the agreement between Greek Cypriot and Egypt in the area of the west of the islands
ignored Turkey’s continental shelf rights and excluded Turkey from
the region. Likewise, in the same area, Turkey’s coastal configuration has projections toward Libya. Therefore, Turkey may sign a delimitation agreement between Egypt and Libya as well in this region.
C.

Proportionality

Proportionality is one of the most important relevant factors
that is often taken into account in the maritime delimitation.208 Maritime delimitation should consider the ratio of the maritime spaces attributed to each Party and the respective coastal lengths. These ratios
mainly involve the determination of the length of relevant coastlines
and the water areas to be attributed. However, in many cases, it may
be difficult to determine the area to be used. However, in the case of
the Eastern Mediterranean, there is no disagreement concerning the
relevant area to be delimited.
In the beginning, ICJ accepted the concept of proportionality
as a final factor to correct inequities produced by the equidistance
method, only in the context of a concave or convex coast. 209 Furthermore, the international courts and tribunal enlarged the function

208 Jonathan I. Charney, The Delimitation of Ocean Boundaries 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L
L. 497, 515 (1987).
209 “A final factor to be taken account of is the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality which a delimitation effected according to equitable principles ought to bring about
between the extent of the continental shelf appertaining to the States concerned . . . .” North
Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands),
Judgment,
1969
I.C.J.
3,
¶
98
(Feb.
20,
1969),
http://www.internationalcourts.net/node/131.
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of proportionality geographically 210 and functionally. 211 Thus, proportionality has played a double role in the case law: as a test of equity and a justification for shifting first equidistance lines. 212
The use of proportionality in State practice remains exceptional. In fact, only a few agreements involve maritime delimitation.
In this context, a typical example is the 1974 Agreement between
France and Spain in the Bay of Biscay. 213 Another example is the
1992 Protocol Supplementary to the Agreement between the United
Kingdom and Ireland of September 7, 1988. 214 The authors also observe that it is hard to assess whether, and to what extent, this factor
played a role in any specific delimitation agreement. 215

210 In the Tunisia/Libya case, the I.C.J. relied on proportionality when delimiting between
adjacent coasts, although there was no situation of concavity or convexity. Continental Shelf
(Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. 18, ¶ 131 (Feb. 24),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/63/6267.pdf.
In some cases, proportionality was
considered in delimitation between States with opposite coasts. See Award of the Arbitral
Tribunal in the Second Stage of the Proceedings (Maritime Delimitation) Eritrea/Yemen, 22
R.I.A.A. 335, ¶ 165-168 (Dec. 17, 1999), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXII/3 35410.pdf; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v.
Norway), Judgment, 1993 I.C.J. 38, ¶ 61-69 (June 14, 1993), http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/78/6743.pdf; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta),
Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 68, 74-75 (June 3, 1985), http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/68/6415.pdf; Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. 246, ¶ 184-85 (Oct.
12, 1984), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/67/6369.pdf. Proportionality was also taken
into account in some cases where the geographical situations differ from the original
situation in the North Sea Continental Shelf judgment. See Maritime Delimitation in the
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J. 61, ¶ 210-16 (Feb. 3, 2009),
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14987.pdf; Arbitration Between Barbados and the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Relating to the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic
Zone and the Continental Shelf Between them, Decision, 27 R.I.A.A. 147, ¶ 337-38 (Apr.
11, 2006), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXVII/147-251.pdf.
211 Proportionality was to be applied as a test of the equitableness of the suggested
delimitation line. See Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982
I.C.J. at ¶ 103; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. at ¶
58. In other instance, proportionality was used as a factor for shifting provisionally drawn
equidistance lines. See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Canada/United States of America), Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. at ¶ 222.
212 YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 201 (2012).
213 Report Number No. 9-2, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,
at 1723.
214 Report Number No. 9-5(2), in III INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note
14, at 2487.
215 Weil, Geographic Considerations in Maritime Delimitation, in I INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14 , at 129.
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Islands

One category of factors that has been regarded from the very
beginning as constituting “relevant circumstances” in the context of
equidistance is the presence of islands. 216 The coastal configurations
of states are quite commonly complicated, or even distorted, by offshore features such as islands, rocks, and reefs. These features affect
maritime delimitation in different ways. 217 However, it is evident,
however, that not all islands218 can be treated as potential relevant circumstances. Only islands politically integrated into a mainland state that
is itself involved in the delimitation can be deemed to be relevant circumstances.219 In the Anglo-French Case, the “nature” of islands was a central issue taken account of by the Court as being relevant considerations
in determining the extent of their influence on the boundary.220
Different factors may be considered when dealing with islands.
In general, there are many examples of State practice in which islands
have been given full effect, half effect, or reduced effect, and also no effect in the case of delimitation between islands and mainlands or between
islands only. Sometimes other factors, such as the size of the islands and
distance, come into play. In some situations, no effect has been granted
to an island because its sovereignty was disputed.221 “In some other cas216 Islands have been regarded from the very beginning as constituting “special
circumstances” in the context of equidistance. HIRAN W. JAYEWARDENE, THE REGIME OF
ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 330 (1989).
217 Derek Bowett, Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary
Delimitations, in I INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 131.
218 There are numerous examples of islands, as the sole unit of entitlement, i.e., Malta,
Cuba, being given separate entitlement and full weight as against mainland coasts. Id. at 133.
In this context, Malta is an exception of full effect. In Libya/Malta case, Malta, as an island
state, was not given full effect vis-à-vis the opposite, mainland Libyan coast. The factor that
dictated the Court`s holding was proportionality. See Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. at ¶ 58.
219 EVANS, supra note 114, at 135.
220 Delimitation of the Contintental Shelf Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, 18 R.I.A.A. at ¶ 171, at 84.
221 In the 1969 Agreement between Iran and Qatar, the island of Halul was ignored,
because of its disputed status, in constructing the mainland-to-mainland equidistant line.
Report Number No. 7-6, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at
1511. Another solution, adopted in the 1986 Agreement between Burma (Myanmar) and
India, is to acknowledge the sovereignty of India but reduce the effect of the island of
Norcondam. Report Number No. 6-3, in II INTERNATİONAL MARİTİME BOUNDARİES, supra
note 14, at 1329.
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es, islands have also been ignored 222 in some instance because of the
method of delimitation used.”223 International courts and tribunals are to
decide the effect given to islands within the framework of equitable principles. In analyzing the case law and State practice to specify islands’ effect in drawing a maritime boundary, it would be appropriate to use an
analytical framework categorizing islands into several groups. In this respect, their geographical location provides a useful criterion. Based on
the geographical location according to the coast, islands may be categorized into four groups: (1) offshore islands; (2) off-lying islands (detached islands); (3) islands in the median zone; and (4) islands ‘on the
wrong side.’224
When considering the islands in the Eastern Mediterranean in
this context, the Greek islands are categorized as ‘on the wrong side’
separating the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean such as Crete,
Rhodes, Karpathos and Strongli as well as an island state like Cyprus.
1.

Islands ‘On the Wrong Side.’

In this regard, islands ‘on the wrong side’ are located at a distance from the mainland of the state under whose sovereignty they lie,
and proximate to the coast under a different sovereignty (i.e., a Greek island Meis/Kastellorizo near to Kaş a town in the province of Antalya in
Turkey). In this category, the most important factor is the position of a
feature. It will often determine whether it will affect the choice or merely
the application of the method. The position is often the crux of the issue.
In such a situation where islands lie ‘on the wrong side’ of a line, a court,
in choosing a boundary, may give them their small enclaves225 of the
continental shelf without modifying the provisional boundary line. This
idea perhaps comes from Whittemore Boggs in his writing in 1951 and
the adherents of the equidistant or median line would also follow Boggs’
suggestion above although they would ignore small islands and islets ly222

The 1981 Agreement between Brazil and France uses an azimuth of 41⁰30’, thus
ignoring the island of Le Grand Connetable off the coast of Guiana. Report Number No. 3-3,
in I INTERNATİONAL MARİTİME BOUNDARİES, supra note 14, at 771.
223 HANDBOOK, supra note 201, ¶ 160, at 34.
224 For another geographical categorization, see Bowet, supra note 217, at 131. For the
typology of islands with respect to their effect in drawing a maritime boundary, see TANAKA,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 204-05.
225 TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 205. In this
situation, the concerned states may opt to ignore the islands altogether for the purposes of
constructing an overall division between their mainland coastlines. TANAKA, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 204.
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ing ‘on the wrong side’ of the median or equidistant line.226 This was
done in the cases dealing with the Channel Islands in the Anglo-French
Continental Shelf case and with the St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands in the
St. Pierre and Miquelon case. These two cases are therefore crucial.
In the Anglo-French case,227 the Court of Arbitration228 considered the effect of the Channel Islands, which are under British sovereignty and lie only 6.6 miles off the French coast. Court of Arbitration
adopted a two-fold solution. First, as the primary boundary, the Court
drew a median line between the mainlands of the two States. Second, it
created a 12-mile enclave to the north and west of the Channel Islands.
In this regard, another crucial case is the St. Pierre and Miquelon
229
case. Central to the dispute was a small group of Islands and islets under French sovereignty, far from France, and close to the Canadian coasts
of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. In this case, the Tribunal considered
that “[g]eographical features are at the heart of the delimitation
process,”230 and has drawn a mushroom shape as a delimitation line.231
“Regarding the cap of the mushroom, the [Tribunal] established a 24mile enclave . . .232 around St-Pierre and Miquelon” by a radial projec226 See generally S. Whittemore Boggs, Delimitation of Seaward Areas Under National
Jurisdiction, 45 AM. J. INT’L L. 240 (1951).
When a median line passes very near islands in the middle of lake or gulf
(or even traverses some islands), if any island can be found to be ‘on the
wrong side of the median line boundary’ (that is, if an island of clearly
established sovereignty is in the water of another State), the alternatives
appear to be: (1) Agree to shift the jurisdiction line from the exact median line, to accommodate the island in question; or (2) Agree that the
State which has sovereignty over the island shall exercise jurisdiction
over it (presumably including its normal belt of territorial sea) without
regard to the median line.
Id. at 258-59; see also KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, THE LAW OF THE SEA AND MARITIME
BOUNDARY DELIMITATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 94 (1987).
227 Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, and the French Republic, 18 R.I.A.A. at ¶ 201-02, at 94-95.
228 See generally Booth, Beyond Critical Security Studies, in CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES
AND WORLD POLITICS, supra note 1.
229 Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon), 11 R.I.A.A. 265, (June 10, 1992), http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/265-341.pdf.
230 Id. at ¶ 24, at 1160.
231 TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 200-01.
232 YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, PREDICTABILITY AND FLEXIBILITY IN THE LAW OF MARITIME
DELIMITATION 199 (2006). The Tribunal determined to the west of the islands a limited
EEZ of 12 miles from the outer limit of the territorial sea with respect to the westward delimitation. The Court of Arbitration “grant[ed]” an additional 12 miles for the EEZ. De-
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tion233 without providing any continental shelf or EEZ to the east of the
islands concerned. In sum, the Tribunal gave in his decision to St-Pierre
and Miquelon three kinds of effect: (1) “partial effect” in the west of StPierre and Miquelon; (2) “enclaving with no effect” in the east of StPierre and Miquelon; and (3) “full-effect” in the northwest and the south
of St-Pierre and Miquelon.234
State practice, regarding islands located ‘on the wrong side,’ suggests establishing an arc of a determinate distance as the common solution.235 There is little doubt that the enclave solution purports to eliminate the distorting effect of equidistance lines. The 1968 Agreement236
between Iran and Saudi Arabia draws a 12-mile arc on the Saudi Arabian
side of Farsi Island, which belongs to Iran. In the 1971 Agreement 237 between Italy and Tunisia, drawing a continental shelf boundary, the Italian
island of Lampione, Lampedusa, and a 12-mile arc surrounded by Pantelleria are on the Tunisian side. “The 1993 Agreement between Colombia
and Jamaica also provides an intriguing solution in that it creates a 12mile enclave around Colombia’s keys on Serranilla and Baja Nuevo.” 238
This raises difficult questions regarding the effect of the islands of one
State on the coast of another State. For instance, such difficulties were
dealt with in the 1978 Agreement 239 between Australia and Papua New
Guinea where the Australian islands of Boigu and Saibai lie within 3-4
miles off the coast of Papua New Guinea. On the landward side, facing
the coast where the distance is less than 6 miles, a clear equidistance line
was established. On the seaward side, however, the territorial seas of all
15 Australian islands lying to the north of the seabed jurisdiction line, in-

limitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon), 11
R.I.A.A. at ¶ 69, at 1170.
233 Id. With respect to the stem of the mushroom, the 200-mile corridor was created
based on the theory of frontal projection. Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada
and France (St. Pierre and Miquelon), 11 R.I.A.A. at ¶ 70, at 1170.
234 TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 204-05.
235 However, there are some agreements which were given full effect to islands. See
Bowett, Islands, Rocks, Reefs, and Low-Tide Elevations in Maritime Boundary Delimitations, in I INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 144-47.
236 Report Number No. 7-7, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,
at 1519.
237 Report Number No. 8-6, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,
at 1611.
238 TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 212, at 213; see also
Report Number No. 2-18, in III INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at
2179.
239 Report Number No. 5-3, in I INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at
929.
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cluding Boigu and Saibai, were restricted to a 3-mile territorial sea arc. 240
In the light of these judgments and agreements, islands in the
Eastern Mediterranean will be a relevant factor. In this context, maritime delimitation between Turkey and Greece should be between the
mainlands of both countries in the semi-enclosed sea and the Greek
island on the wrong side should not be given a continental shelf or an
EEZ except for its territorial waters due to its geographical position
on the opposite side.
2.

Island State

The 1985 Malta/Libya Case is an example of these types of
islands. In the Libya/Malta case, Malta, as an island state, was not
given full effect vis-à-vis the opposite, mainland Libyan coast. 241 In
this context, Cyprus as an island state is similar to Malta in the Mediterranean. As a matter of fact, the median line, which has been drawn
in the agreement demarcating the continental shelf between the island’s northern coast and Turkey, was adjusted for Turkey towards
Cyprus.
E. Security and Navigation Factors
The direct influence of these factors on maritime delimitation
in the case of continental shelf 242 and EEZ remains somewhat unclear. In fact, there is little evidence that maritime boundaries were
established to reflect security and navigation interests.243 However,

240 Treaty Between Australia and the Independent State of Papua New Guinea Concerning
Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area Between the two Countries, Including the
Area Known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters, signed 18 December 1978, 1986 ATS 4
(entered
in
to
force
15
February
1985),
art
3,
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1985/4.html.
241 See generally Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985
I.C.J. 13.
242 Theoretically, navigation has little relationship to the institution of the continental
shelf. As with Article 3 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, Article 78(1) of
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention stipulates: “The rights of the coastal State over the
continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters or of the air space
above those waters.” UNCLOS, supra note 3, at Art. 3.
243 Oxman, Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations, in I INTERNATIONAL
MARİTİME BOUNDARİES, supra note 14, at 22.
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the right to “freedom of navigation” in EEZ is “subject to the relevant provisions of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,” 244 and accordingly, unlike navigation on the high seas, States prefer to avoid
situations where a navigational route of high strategic relevance will
come under the jurisdiction of another coastal State, i.e., Aegean Sea.
There are nevertheless aspects of these regimes that States may perceive as affecting their security interests. 245 Therefore, “States may
desire to ensure that specific navigation routes are within their waters, or at least outside the waters of the neighboring state.” 246 Moreover, there is a belief that particular navigable channels should be
taken into account in any delimitation. 247
Some cases before the ICJ and an arbitral tribunal, respectively, interpreted security as proximity to the coasts by two of the States
pleading in those cases. The ICJ, in the Libya/Malta case, regarded
security factors as a relevant circumstance; however, it did not affect
the location of the continental shelf boundary because the delimitation line drawn by the Court was “not so near to the coast of either
Party as to raise questions of security as a particular consideration in
the present case.” 248 The same applied to the Guinea/GuineaBissau, 249 Greenland/Jan Mayen, 250 and Romania/ Ukraine 251 cases.
In State practice, some agreements take into account the consideration of security and navigation factors. In the 1988 Agree-

244 Article 58(3) of the Convention prescribes that, “in exercising their rights . . . States
shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the
laws and regulations adopted by that State in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention and other rules of international law.” UNCLOS, supra note 14, at Art. 58(3).
245 Oxman, Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations, in I INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 23.
246 Oxman, Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations, in I INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 26.
247 EVANS, supra note 114, at 179.
248 Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. at ¶ 51.
249 The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau
(Guinea and Guinea-Bissau), 19 R.I.A.A. at ¶ 124, at 252 (accepting that security factors
might be relevant circumstances; however, the Arbitration Court also held that they would
not affect the conclusion).
250 Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v.
Norway), Judgment, 1993 I.C.J. at ¶ 81, at 74-75 (discarding Norway’s argument requiring
protection since the boundary to be established was not sufficiently near Jan Mayen’s coast to
create a security problem).
251 Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, 2009 I.C.J.
at ¶ 204, at 128 (“The provisional equidistance line determined by the Court fully respects
the legitimate security interests of either Party. Therefore, there is no need to adjust the line
on the basis of this consideration.”).
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ment 252 between Sweden and the former Soviet Union, the island
Gotland, which has a Curial role in the national defense system of
Sweden, influenced delimitation. In the 1980 Agreement 253 between
Norway and Iceland, security considerations influenced Norway’s
concession for Iceland accepting its full 200-mile EEZ. Furthermore,
agreements contain specific clauses to protect maritime interests. For
instance, the 1978 Agreement 254 between the Netherlands (Antilles)
and Venezuela made detailed provisions on the right of transit passage and the 1990 Agreement 255 between Trinidad, Tobago, and Venezuela specifies the right of transit passage through the Strait concerned. 256
In sum, security and navigation, according to these decisions
and agreements, become relevant in association with the decisionmakers power to shift a provisional line to reflect equity, taking into
consideration the distance between the two states. 257
F.

Economic Factors: Joint Maritime Development
Regime

The economic value of any natural resources is a dominant element in the eyes of the parties, 258 and this is reflected in bilateral
agreements. Though the Courts recognize the parties’ concerns, they
do not place much weight upon the location of natural resources
252 Report Number No. 10-9, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,
at 2057.
253 Report Number No. 9-4, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITİME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,
at 1755.
254 Report Number No. 2-12, in I INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,
at 615.
255 Report Number No. 2-13(3), in I INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note
14, at 675.
256 Oxman, Political, Strategic, and Historical Considerations, in I INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 126.
257 FARAJ ABDULLAH AHNISH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND
THE PRACTICE OF STATES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA 100 (1993).
258 Robert W. Smith, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States 71 GEOGRAPHICAL
REV. 396, 410 (1981) (explaining that R. W. Smith, the one-time chief officer of the U.S.
Office of the Geographer, Department of State, in case of the negotiation of boundary
delimitation by agreement stated that, “Attention must be given to unique characteristics of
each environment, as well as to other factors such as coastal configurations, resource
locations and marine uses”); EVANS, supra note 114, at 198.
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when drawing boundaries. 259 Regarding natural resources related to
continental shelf, some judgments have considered natural resources
as relevant but did not take them into account when creating maritime
boundaries, i.e., the North Sea Continental Shelf, 260 Tunisia/Libya,261
and Libya/Malta 262 cases.
Also, State practice involving economic factors usually have
not directly affected the location of boundaries although economic
considerations played a decisive role in some agreements. In the
1969 Agreement 263 between Qatar and the United Arab Emirates
(Abu Dhabi), the boundary line was drawn to coincide with the location of the al-Bunduq oilfield. In the 1958 Agreement 264 between
Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the boundary was delimited so as to coincide with the limits of the oil field. The 1988 Agreement 265 between
Sweden and the former Soviet Union is a typical example of fishery
resources. In the 1978 Agreement 266 between the Netherlands (Antilles) and Venezuela, the boundary was drawn to preserve the jurisdiction of the Netherlands on the west side of Aruba, which had potential hydrocarbon deposits. In the 1989 Agreement 267 between
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, the equidistance line was modified in the Columbus Channel and in the southeastern sector for the
purpose of preserving the integrity of the existing oil fields.
259

Smith, The Maritime Boundaries of the United States, supra note 258, at 401.
See generally North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark;
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (considering the
presence of natural resources as a relevant circumstance, but rejected the argument referring
to natural resources as the concept of a just and equitable share).
261 See generally Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982
I.C.J. 18. The court regarded natural resources as relevant circumstances; however, it did
not come into play in the process of delimitation. Id. at ¶ 107, at 77-78.
262 See generally Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, 1985
I.C.J. 13. The court indicated that natural resources could be relevant circumstances “so far
as known or readily ascertainable.” Id. at ¶ 50, at 41. When drawing a continental shelf
boundary, however, it was based solely on geographical factors, and economic
considerations played no role in the judgment since little information had been given relating
to natural resources. Id. at ¶ 50, at 41.
263 Report Number No. 8-7, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,
at 1541.
264 Report Number No. 7-3, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,
at 1499.
265 In this agreement fisheries were the vital issue. Report Number No. 10-9, in II
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14, at 2957.
266 Report Number No. 2-12, in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note 14,
at 615.
267 Report Number No. 2-13(2), in II INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES, supra note
14, at 655.
260
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Besides these agreements above, in cases where States have
been unable to establish a maritime boundary for various political,
geographical or legal reasons, and State practice has adopted flexible
solutions in this field: ‘joint development zones.’
The International Court of Justice observed in The North Sea
Cases that a regime of joint jurisdiction or exploitation was an option
for States where delimitation efforts produced overlapping claims to
areas of natural resources. 268 Many more joint development agreements have emerged since the ICJ made that observation.
On the other hand, articles 74 and 83 of the Law of the Sea
Convention provide that if countries fail to agree on delimitation,
they should develop provisional arrangements of a practical nature.
Article 123 of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention provides in part
that States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, such as the
Mediterranean Sea, should cooperate in the exercise of their rights
and the performance of their duties under this Convention.
1.

The Characteristics of a Joint Maritime
Development Regime

Joint development regime should exhibit certain characteristics. “First, it should be between States, rather than between a State
and a private firm or between private companies.” Second, each State
party may convey some of its sovereign rights to a supra-national authority that is responsible for regulating the zone.
The third element of a joint development regime
is its concern with exploration for and exploitation of
natural resources on the continental shelf, as well as
the living resources and other uses of superjacent waters . . . .
Many of the joint maritime regimes have been established as provisional measures, as opposed to final
settlements. 269
268 North Sea Continental Shelf (Fed. Republic of Ger./Den; Fed. Republic of Ger./Neth.),
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. at ¶ 99.
269 Yücel Acer, A Proposal for a Joint Maritime Development Regime in the Aegean Sea,
37 J. MAR. L. & COM. 49, 55 (2006).
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Designing a Joint Development Area

The factors relevant to defining a joint development area may
limit its extent to only some part of a whole maritime area. A key
factor is the location of a known natural resource that straddles a
boundary or an area of overlapping claims. In some cases, the possibility of finding a common resource was enough incentive for States
to establish a regime.
The precedents make it clear that overlapping claims
are another relevant factor [for States to establish a regime] . . . . In the Malaysia-Thailand Agreement, for
instance, the area of overlapping claims was the key
factor. The Sudan-Saudi Arabia Agreement established a joint regime covering the middle section,
which could have been the area of conflicting claims
in case of a delimitation attempt. 270
In some instances where the countries disagreed on the exact
location of a boundary previously determined by a third party, they
eventually agreed on a joint development regime to overcome remaining disagreements.
There are other factors. In all of these examples, the joint development areas cover only a designated section of the whole maritime area.
3.

Maritime Joint Development Regime

It is up to the parties to decide what level of cooperation is
appropriate through a joint regime. Many factors affect their choice,
including their expectations and the characteristics of the area in geographical, political, and legal terms. 271
XI.

THE ARCTIC MODEL

The Arctic Council serves as a model of a Maritime Joint Development Regime. The organization established on September 19,
1996, with the signing of the Ottawa Declaration gives the Arctic
270

MASAHIRO MIYOSHI, THE JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS IN RELATION
MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION, in 2 MARITIME BRIEFING 30 (Clive Schofield eds.,
1999).
271 Acer, supra note 269, at 55-56.

TO
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Council as a high-level intergovernmental forum a broad mandate to
address issues of relevance to the Arctic Region and its peoples; in
particular, matters of sustainable development and environmental
protection in the Arctic. 272 The eight member states: Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden, and the United States joined
with six organizations as Permanent Participants representing the
Arctic Indigenous peoples 273 together produced many groundbreaking studies dealing with a range of environmental issues, safety,
and the protection of indigenous cultures. In recent years, the Arctic
Council plays a significant role in resolving matters in the Arctic. It
adopted legally binding agreements in 2011 about search and rescue
collaboration and coordinated response efforts in the Arctic and 2013
marine pollution incidents. 274 China and other non-Arctic Asian
countries, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations,
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have expressed interest
in gaining observer status. 275
272 The Arctic Council: A Backgrounder, ARCTİC COUNCIL (May 23, 2016),
https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us (last visited May 15, 2017).
273 Id.
Six international organizations representing Arctic Indigenous Peoples have
permanent participant status: the Arctic Athabaskan Council, Aleut International
Association, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North and Saami Council. Id.
274 Id.
275 The Growing Importance of the Arctic Council, STRATFOR (May 17, 2013),
https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/growing-importance-arctic-council. Twelve non-Arctic
countries have been admitted as observers to the Arctic Council: China (admitted May
2013), France (admitted October 2000), Germany (admitted September 1998), India
(admitted May 2013), Italy (admitted May 2013), Japan (admitted May 2013), The
Netherlands (admitted September 1998), Poland (admitted September 1998), Singapore
(admitted May 2013), South Korea (admitted May 2013), Spain (admitted October 2006),
United Kingdom (admitted September 1998). Observers, ARCTIC COUNCIL (July 28, 2016),
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/observers. Nine intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organisations have been given observer status: International Federation of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies (admitted October 2000), International Union for the Conservation of Nature (admitted October 2000), Nordic Council of
Ministers (admitted September 1998), Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (admitted
November 2004), North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (admitted October 2000),
Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (admitted September
1998), United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (admitted October 2002), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (admitted September 1998), United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) (admitted September 1998). Id. Eleven non-governmental
organizations are observers to the Arctic Council: Advisory Committee on Protection of the
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Due to the climate change and melting of Arctic polar glaciers, trading routes providing Europe with increased access to Asia’s
markets are becoming now more accessible as well as vast reserves
of oil, gas, and minerals under the Arctic Ocean. 276 It means that geopolitical matters have become eminently important in the Arctic region. As the Arctic region becomes ever more economically viable,
the Arctic Council is becoming a forum to sort out the implications of
the environmental changes. As member states attempt to prove that
their continental shelf extends beyond the 200 nm limit from their
coastlines, overlapping EEZ boundary claims disputes are rising.
Disputes have emerged in the South China Sea or Eastern Mediterranean region over reefs and several rocks located between Canada and
Greenland, Chukchi Seas and Bering Seas between the U.S. and Russia, and between Denmark and Canada the Hans Island and the Lincoln Sea. Despite these international maritime claims the Arctic
Council has maintained a zone of peace and stability. Also disputed
are waterways like the Northwest Passage viewed by Canada as a national waterway while by other countries as an international passageway. 277

Seas (ACOPS) (admitted October 2000), Arctic Cultural Gateway (admitted November
2004), Association of World Reindeer Herders (admitted October 2000), Circumpolar
Conservation Union (admitted October 2000), International Arctic Science Committee
(IASC) (admitted September 1998), International Arctic Social Sciences Association
(admitted October 2002), International Union for Circumpolar Health (admitted September
1998), International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (admitted October 2002), Northern
Forum (admitted September 1998), University of the Arctic (admitted November 2004),
World Wide Fund for Nature—Global Arctic Program (WWF) (admitted September 1998).
Id.
276 UK Climate Change Risk Assessment: Government Report, at 28 (Jan. 2012),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69487/pb1369
8-climate-risk-assessment.pdf “According to the International Energy Agency’s 2013 World
Energy Outlook, ‘the Arctic likely contains the world’s largest remaining area of
conventional, undiscovered oil and natural gas, estimated at 13 percent of recoverable oil
and 30 percent of recoverable natural gas resources.’ ” SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE ARTIC,
RESPONDING TO A CHANGING ARTIC, REPORT, 2014-5, HL 118, ¶ 78, at 32 (UK).
277 Jill Mahoney, Canadians Rank Arctic Sovereignty as Top Foreign-Policy Priority, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadians-rank-arcticsovereignty-as-top-foreign-policy-priority/article563348/ (last updated Jan. 25, 2011).
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278

Figure-7: Arctic Circle

278

The
Roar
of
Ice
Cracking,
ECONOMIST,
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21571127-will-asian-countries-consolidateor-disrupt-arctic-stability-roar-ice-cracking (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).
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279

Figure-8: Arctic Circle
In the 2013 “Vision for the Arctic,” Ministers of the Arctic
States wrote: “We are confident that there is no problem that we cannot solve together through our cooperative relationships with existing
international law and good will.” 280 This commitment was reaffirmed
in (2011), Kiruna (2013), and Iqaluit (2015). Each of the Ministers
of Arctic States recognized that constructive cooperation among the
279 Arctic
Region,
CIA,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook//graphics/ref_maps/political/jpg/arctic_region.jpg (last visited Apr. 30, 2017).
280 Vision for the Arctic, ARCTIC COUNCIL 2 (May 15, 2013), https://oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/bitstream/handle/11374/287/MM08_Kiruna_Vision_for_the_Arctic_Final_form
atted%20%281%29.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
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members of the Arctic Council is essential to maintaining peace and
stability.
XII.

CONCLUSION

Not all joint development agreements have been successful in
cooperatively utilizing the natural resources of a maritime area, but
exploitation is not the only benefit of such agreements. They can
abate a delimitation dispute and create a friendlier atmosphere facilitating settlement of other maritime disputes and critical human security issues.
These benefits will no doubt be realized if a joint development regime is established in the Eastern Mediterranean and China
Seas. Attention, therefore, ought to be turned to identifying an appropriate regime. The analyses of State practice above demonstrate
that there are various options, some of which may be well suited to
the area and acceptable to the parties.
Cooperation among the different parties needs to be comprehensive. The parties should jointly establish an organizational structure for the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources in
the seabed, sharing the coasts and revenues in proportion to various
factors. In order to reduce tensions and improve the environment for
negotiations, Washington should work behind the scenes to promote
and organize an effort for a joint exploration of seabed resources
without prejudice to sovereignty, as has already been done by Malaysia and Thailand (1979), Malaysia and Vietnam (1992), and Malaysia
and Brunei (2009). 281 With the U.S. adopting a much more proactive, comprehensive, and well-coordinated global energy security
strategy aimed at resolving international maritime boundary disputes
and improving human security, allies together with other powers
could achieve peace, stability, and prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean and China Sea regions. The U.S. could complement the ambitions of regional pivotal or major powers by supporting international
281

America’s Security Role in the South China Sea: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Asia and the Pacific of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 114th Cong. (July 23, 2015)
(statement of Michael D. Swaine, Ph.D., Senior Associate, Asia Program, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/ FA05/20150723/
103787/HHRG-114-FA05-Wstate-SwaineM-20150723.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
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maritime law arbitration as a gateway to address broader human security issues such as the migration of Syrian refugees seeking asylum in
central Europe. Finally, the U.S. could become a party to UNCLOS
clearly servicing U.S. national security, economic, and environmental
interests while advocating a “Joint Maritime Development Regime,”
modelled after the Arctic Council where the organization would arbitrate maritime boundary disputes by sorting out the implications of
the EEZ claims of international law.
As an intergovernmental organization, the Arctic Council bases its work on consensus building among the member states when
possible and not the International Court of Justice, which the U.S.
tends not to favor for its disputes let alone for other disputes and a
reason for not joining UNCLOS. Moreover, many of the member
states of the Arctic Circle as in the Eastern Mediterranean and China
Sea regions are signatories to the United Nations Law of the Sea
Convention prone to using international adjudication by calling on
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCS) to settle disputes. America’s differentiation from countries like Russia and others can best be demonstrated by the insistence on a government by laws rather than by personal ambitions.
With the U.S. government supporting such a strategy, the security
providers—specifically the states in the region – would invest the
time and resources to resolve international maritime disputes as a
prospect for cooperation in the field of energy and a panacea for improving human security. U.S. involvement would assist countries in
the region in tackling Islamist terrorist threats from the eastern shores
among them ISIL, reduce the escalation of tensions in the area from
becoming an international crisis, and help develop a common strategic, economic and political identity. This positive impact would provide part of a solution to the Eastern Mediterranean challenges to facilitate the region’s becoming one of the key areas for global security
in the context of a diversified energy hub for the Eastern Mediterranean region and Europe’s energy security. Many of the problems affecting the world cannot be solved at a national level, from global
warming to the fight against terrorism. The judicial integration of the
U.S. in the international legal community is an essential condition of
soft power tactics for restoring U.S. influence in the world today.
Under this framework, the U.S. would promote liberal internationalism to support multilateral cooperation through international organizations such as the Arctic Council, which it recently chaired, by en-
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couraging binding agreements and collective compliance with international law. It means adopting a policy pursued by Franklin Delano
Roosevelt 282 to embrace great power cooperation within international
institutions and international law relinquishing the concept of American exceptionalism but emphasizing the model of America as a nation that treats regional hegemonies and all countries as partners, if
they uphold the principles of the United Nations Charter and other international accords. However, the U.S. would not relinquish its dominant role as a power of last resort when all threads break within the
liberal world order, and countries usurp territories belonging to other
nations such as Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and parts of Georgia or Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. In such cases, U.S. strength
should be implemented through other soft power policies such as
multilateral sanctions and cyberattacks as a template to stimulate cooperation concerning China and Russia with the goal of achieving
consensus about the regional order in their respective theaters. The
U.S. should seek cooperative engagement with both regional powers
but respond to provocations with deterrent actions including hard
power consistent with its security commitments. Deployment of naval assets and American forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and the
South China Sea are measures of deterrence to raise the costs of future perceived aggression by other countries. Unlike Russian policies
of aggression violating international law, China has demonstrated its
“bold” stand to defend its national interests through serious incidents
in the region including collisions between Vietnamese and Chinese
vessels and Chinese and Filipino fishing ships in the areas claimed by
both countries. China has not shown aggression through military
force because China still believes in bilateral negotiations as to their
claims to sovereignty over islands in the South China Sea but refusing to recognize the judgment in the case of The South China Sea
Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines vs. The People’s Republic of China). 283 The tactics of soft and hard power do not facilitate
282 Franklin
D.
Roosevelt:
Foreign
Affairs,
UVA:
MİLLER
CTR.,
http://millercenter.org/president/biography/fdroosevelt-foreign-affairs (last visited Feb. 25,
2017).
283 Permanent Court of Arbitration Press Release The South China See Arbitration: The
Republic of the Philippines vs. The People’s Republic of China (July 12, 2016),
http://www.pcacases.com/web/view/7.
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future cooperation as much as they maintain the geopolitical status
quo with China using coercion instead of multilateral consensus to
pursue its national interests. With the U.S. government supporting a
Joint Maritime Development Regime strategy, the security providers—specifically the states in the region – would invest the attention
and resources generated from resolving international maritime disputes as a panacea for improving human security and reducing the
escalation of tensions in both regions from becoming an international
crisis.
Consensus should be the driver of negotiations, and selfcentered politics should be subsidiary as much as possible. A strong
body composed of politicians and experts from all parties should be
in charge to perform a broad range of functions and administer the
joint regime effectively. TRNC made two similar proposals for offshore cooperation through the UN Secretary General in September
2011 and September 2012, respectively, which Turkey endorses. 284
The latter proposal, titled the “plan regarding the activities related to
hydrocarbon resources off the coastlines of the island of Cyprus (both
North and South),” was to be agreed by both sides “without prejudice
to their legal and political positions on the Cyprus problem.” 285 The
plan also contains a suggestion that the hydrocarbon resources, extracted from both sides, be “transported through a pipeline via Turkey.” 286 The RoC rejected both proposals.
Could American diplomacy towards the Eastern Mediterranean region be based on more than economic opportunity as suggested
by Turkey such as transporting hydrocarbons through a pipeline?
Can American foreign policy embrace not only networks to resolve
maritime disputes in the region but also human security issues imbued with the historical, nationalist, and cultural identities in the region to end religious intolerance, fight climate change and other ecological threats, stabilize mass migration, eradicate human trafficking,
and enhance pluralistic forms of government? Does American foreign policy take into account Turkey’s threat perceptions and interests? Since congruence of interests is key to a successful alliance, the
United States must do more to redefine its role by allowing regional
security dynamics to end regional disputes. Even after its scheduled
284
285
286

Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 15.
Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 15.
Gürel & Le Cornu, supra note 24, at 15.
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withdrawal from the Middle East, the U.S. remains an important factor in the regional balance of power. The fundamental question remains: What strategy will the U.S. pursue?
In recent years under former President Obama, a pivot to Asia
had begun as well as a recalibration in various regions to align American interests with the rise of China and Russia in East Asia, Eurasia,
and other parts of the world while currently engaging militarily in
strategic areas of Europe and the Middle East. The U.S. cannot be
the global policeman to manage security in all parts of the world. It
needs allies. The recent joint effort of the U.S. and Turkey to fight
ISIS reflects just such an understanding, for it is based on both an appreciation of Turkey’s stabilizing role in the region and a willingness
to allow Turkey to assume regional responsibilities. Although this
cooperation should not dictate how Ankara defines its priorities, it
should not be at the price of a country targeting other ethnic groups
along with ISIS or abusing the principles of democracy and individual liberties. Furthermore, the U.S. should play a significant role in
brokering daily issues related to state and human rights security issues by creating a “Joint Maritime Development Regime,” modeled
after the Arctic Council making the meaning and the advantages of
an ally dependent on the congruence of interests. In the past, Turkey
was an active trans-Atlantic partner in helping contain the threat of
ethnic nationalism in the Balkans and contributing to the overall stability of Southeastern Europe. Turkey was eager to serve as a “pivotal” power in assisting the West to gain meaningful access to the
Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asia based on its centuries’ long
history at the heart of the Ottoman Empire. The expansion of the
Western security umbrella to these regions seemed the most efficient
strategy to stabilize them and ensure their peaceful transitions. It also
provided Turkey an opportunity to expand its influence into postSoviet geography and implement its foreign policy of Strategic
Depth. 287 However, the U.S. has not pursued a coordinated effort
with its trans-Atlantic allies to improve the human security in these
regions due to lack of America’s political will and the thinking that at
287 Joshua W. Walker, Understanding Turkey’s Foreign Policy Through Strategic Depth,
ACAD.
(2010),
TRANSATLANTİC
http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/publications/understanding-strategic-depth-joshuawalker.
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least it has undertaken attempts to understand and consider the interests of potential allies’ interests. President Erdogan might be more
receptive if he could expand Turkey’s role as a “pivotal power” by
endorsing a “Joint Maritime Development Regime” and sort out the
EEZ claims of other regional states by international law. With the
U.S. government partnering with countries in the region in a “Joint
Maritime Development Regime” strategy, the changing dynamics of
Turkey’s relations with the West economically, politically and strategically would trigger a new foreign-policy activism throughout the
Silk Road from China to the Balkans. Turkey’s role would elevate
into an increasingly active, capable, and valuable partner and ally in
resolving the immediate global energy security issues in the Eastern
Mediterranean and, in return strengthening relations with the West as
a bulwark against al-Qaeda and ISIL terrorism, Russian expansionism, and anti-Islamism. Once the civil war in Syria ends, a “Joint
Maritime Regime” would facilitate peace, prosperity and human security by opening the door to use the region’s natural resources to rebuild and modernize member states infrastructures, judiciary, economy, social services, and human security. The Eastern Mediterranean
region would become a bridge between Europe and the Middle East
bolstering economic resources as a force for stability and consolidate
power to protect humanity in terms of human security against disruptive forces. The region could achieve these goals by adopting maritime delimitation approaches to establish the boundaries and jurisdictions of all states in the area as a vital step in developing regional
cooperation and security with adversarial powers and allies under the
umbrella of international law.
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